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LAW AND THE BLOCKCHAIN
Usha R. Rodrigues *
All contracts are necessarily incomplete.
The
inefficiencies of bargaining over every contingency,
coupled with humans’ innate bounded rationality, mean
that contracts cannot anticipate and address every
potential eventuality. One role of law is to fill gaps in
incomplete contracts with default rules. Emerging
technologies have created new, yet equally incomplete,
types of contracts that exist outside of this traditional
gap-filling legal role. The blockchain is a distributed
ledger that allows the cryptographic recording of
transactions and permits “smart” contracts that selfexecute automatically if their conditions are met.
Because humans code the contracts of the blockchain,
gaps in these contracts will arise. Yet in the world of
“smart contracting” on the blockchain, there is no place
for the law to step in to supply default rules—no legal
intervention point. The lack of a legal intervention point
means that law on the blockchain works in a
fundamentally different way from law in the corporeal
world. Business organizational law provides a prime
example of how the law uses default rules to fill gaps in
an incomplete contract and how the law works
differently in the blockchain context.

* Kilpatrick Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I thank participants
of the University of Washington Faculty Workshop Series, the First Annual Works in
Progress Program on Blockchains and the Law, the Minnesota Law Faculty Works in
Progress Workshop, and the 2018 Law & Entrepreneurship Retreat.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2016, a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO)
launched on Ethereum, a platform that permits layering programs
called “smart contracts” on top of a cryptocurrency. 1 This DAO was
“decentralized” because no one person or entity controlled it; it was
“autonomous” because it ran itself, and it was an “organization” of
a type the world had not seen before. More of a “virtual venture
capital fund” than a corporation, the 2016 DAO (as I will term this
particular DAO) sold tokens in cyberspace that entitled the holders
to certain voting rights, including the right to vote on proposals for
projects that the DAO would fund. 2
The 2016 DAO might sound like unintelligible science fiction, but
businesses organized in the virtual world of the blockchain have
raised millions of dollars over the past eighteen months. 3 For
purposes of this introduction, all the reader needs to understand is
that blockchain technology permits “smart contracts” that allow
coders to layer on top of currency exchanges particular conditions
under which those exchanges will occur. 4 In other words, these
contracts are self-executing. The Ethereum blockchain can record
not only “X paid Y nine ether,” but also “X will pay nine ether Y if
the Dow Jones Industrial Average reaches 30,000” (ether being the
unit of cryptocurrency on the Ethereum blockchain). 5 These smart
contracts enabled the 2016 DAO to implement fairly sophisticated
governance and exit rules autonomously on the blockchain.
1 Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 350 (2017)
(citation omitted).
2 dat81, What if the whole world was operated by blockchain?, STEEMIT, https://steemit.
com/crypto/@dat81/what-if-the-whole-world-was-operated-by-blockchain (last visited Feb. 15,
2018).
3 Giulio Prisco, The DAO Raises More Than $117 Million in World's Largest Crowdfunding
to Date, BITCOINMAGAZINE (May 16, 2016, 2:09 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/thedao-raises-more-than-million-in-world-s-largest-crowdfunding-to-date-1463 422191/.
4 Antonio Madeira, The DAO, The Hack, The Soft Fork and The Hard Fork,
CRYPTOCOMPARE (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-thehack-the-soft-fork-and-the-hard-fork/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
5 The astute reader may wonder how the blockchain knows when the Dow Jones Industrial
Average reaches 30,000. This question of how the blockchain receives reliable input from the
outside world is a key problem blockchain businesses must address. How do oracle services work
https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/
under the hood?, ETHEREUM STACK EXCHANGE,
questions/11589/how-do-oracle-services-work-under-the-hood (last visited Feb. 24, 2018).
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The 2016 DAO was enormous success—raising $150 million
worth of ether in just a few months. 6 It was also a tremendous
failure: because of a flaw in its code, an unknown individual was
able to siphon about $50 million into a private account, before being
foiled by a technological fix that unwound the DAO and restored all
DAO participants’ ether to its original holders. 7 Although the 2016
DAO failed, entrepreneurs following its lead launched 235 initial
coin offerings (ICOs) in 2017, raising a total of $3.7 billion from the
public. 8
DAOs may represent a dead-end in the history of business
organizations—that remains to be seen. 9 What matters for the
purposes of this Article is what the 2016 DAO can tell us about the
nature of contract law and business law, and the potential for the
blockchain to upset fundamental expectations about the role of law
in both fields.
Academic literature teaches, quite correctly, that all contracts
are incomplete. 10 For one thing, it would be inefficient for two
parties to try to anticipate each and every future contingency and
hash out an appropriate contractual response. 11 But even if two
parties were ambitious and patient enough to attempt such a feat,
it would prove impossible. Given the bounded rationality of humans

6 Antonio Madeira, The DAO, The Hack, The Soft Fork and The Hard Fork,
CRYPTOCOMPARE (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-thehack-the-soft-fork-and-the-hard-fork/.
7 To be precise, the Ethereum blockchain forked, creating two parallel Ethereum
blockchains, Ethereum and Ethereum Classic. On the more popular (and valuable)
Ethereum, the code was rewritten as if the DAO had not launched. But in the alternate
reality of Ethereum Classic, the DAO continues to exist and the $50 million transfer of funds
did, in fact, occur. Ameer Rosic, What is Ethereum Classic? Ethereum vs Ethereum Classic,
BLOCKGEEKS.COM, https://blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-ethereum-classic/ (last visited Feb.
15, 2018).
8 Cryptocurrency ICO Stats 2017, COINSCHEDULE, https://www.coinschedule.com/stats.
html (last visited Jan. 17, 2017). Note, however, that not all ICOs are DAOs.
9 Although more DAOs are organizing, see infra Part IV.A.2.
10 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 92 (1989).
11 Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract
Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 190 (2005) (“A contract is incomplete if it fails to provide
for the efficient set of obligations in each possible state of the world.”).
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and the uncertainties of life, one simply cannot contract for every
future possibility. 12
A key role of contract law is to fill the gaps humans wittingly and
unwittingly leave in their consensual dealings. 13 Much of the
incomplete-contracting literature deals with how the law should fill
these gaps. 14 Some rules are default rules that the law supplies
when the parties are silent. 15 Others are immutable rules that fix
certain rights, duties, and obligations regardless of the parties’
designs. 16 In both cases, the pattern is the same. Step one: Either
there is a dispute regarding the interpretation of a term or an
unforeseen event occurs. Step two: a court determines what legal
rule will fill the gap.
In the blockchain, there is no step two. Step one occurs as it
always has. After all, it is humans who code the contracts of the
blockchain, and so gaps arise. But in the blockchain world, step two
does not occur. Because the smart “contract” is code alone, there is
no gap, in the sense of an entry point, for the law to step in to fill.
Indeed, the case of the blockchain reveals an ambiguity in the
language that never before created a problem. The “gap” in an
incomplete contract is both the topic that the contract never
explicitly addressed, and the place in the contract where the default
law steps in to fill the breach. The blockchain has no gap, in the
second sense of the term. Put differently, there is no room, no place
for default law on the blockchain, unless the blockchain
affirmatively lets it in. There is, to use my terminology, no legal
intervention point.
This is the case because the DAO organizers made clear that
their code contained the entire agreement between the participants,
including all means of enforcement. 17 To be sure, that code could
12 See Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete Contracts in A Complete Contract
World, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 725, 725 (2006) (“Contracts are never fully complete, because
some contractual incompleteness is inevitable, given the costs of thinking about, bargaining
over, and drafting for future contingencies.”).
13 See generally, Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 88-89.
17 Bryant Joseph Gilot, Code != Law, MEDIUM (July 4, 2016), https://medium.com/@Crypt
oIQ.ca/code-law-58b6e39dd626.
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and did produce problems—bugs, questions of interpretation, call
them what you will. Outside the blockchain universe, the parties
would have dealt with these matters by advancing arguments
before courts as to which interpretation was the one the parties had
intended. A judge would have listened, evaluated both parties’
arguments as to the law’s application to the facts at hand, and
issued a ruling. On the blockchain, however, there is no such chance
for law to intervene because by design the code is self-contained.
Once the code is released into the world, its programmers can no
longer unilaterally alter it—unless the widely-dispersed,
anonymous blockchain community can be convinced to do so.
Because of the decentralized, distributed nature of the blockchain
ledger, changes in the code will be rejected unless the code itself
contemplates subsequent modifications. The only possible legal
intervention point is not upon the blockchain itself, but rather
identifiable humans that promote blockchain enterprises and can
be held liable for their workings.
This Article is the first to identify and explore the radical
transformation of the relationship between contract and law that
the blockchain represents. 18 As we will see, the resistance of the
blockchain to the workings of the law represents both a strength
and a weakness. Although the implications of the blockchain for
general contract law are profound, the bulk of this Article will focus
its attention on business entities as incomplete contracts.
Economists and legal academics alike have followed the lead of
Frank Easterbrook and Dan Fischel in treating the corporation as
contract, 19 and this literature is particularly relevant to the DAO.

18 The literature on the blockchain is growing at a rapid clip, but so far has focused on its
applications. See David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, 21 REVIEW OF
FINANCE, 7-31, 2017 (examining application of the technology to financial record-keeping);
Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384 (2017), Kevin Werbach &
Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313 (2017); Robinson Randolph, The
New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of Initial Coin Offerings (Sept. 1, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3087541, Jonathan Rohr & Aaron
Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the Democratization of
Public Capital Markets (October 4, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3048104.
19 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989).
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To illustrate the blockchain’s transformative relationship with
business association law, we start with a simple observation:
fundamentally, business association law fills gaps. Business
association law supplies default rules that participants tailor to
their needs. 20 This feature explains why U.S. corporate law is often
described as “enabling” in nature, 21 providing relatively few
mandatory rules. 22 But for entities organized purely on the
blockchain, there are no legal intervention points for default rules
to fill unless coders affirmatively create them. There is no space for
default law has no purchase on the blockchain. 23
The lack of legal intervention point is a double-edged sword. The
blockchain grants its entities a power that corporeally organized
entities do not have—the power to avoid the dangers of partnership
without resorting to organizational law. 24 In the physical world,
entrepreneurs have every incentive to make use of business
association law to avoid the partnership form. While corporations,
LLCs, and other limited liability entities, 25 must file with the state
and pay fees, there is nothing one need affirmatively do to form a
partnership. 26 All one needs is an “association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.” 27 As
Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 187-88 (2004).
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1417 (1989).
22 Id. at 1418.
23 As I will explain further in Part IV, I am not claiming that the law should not regulate
in this space, the “cyber-separatist” position. See Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, The Shape of
Governance: Analyzing the World of Internet Regulation, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 605, 619 (2003).
Instead, I am claiming as a descriptive matter that an entity organized solely on the
blockchain would not be susceptible to regulation, as long as its corporeal-world organizers
remained anonymous.
24 I prefer the term corporeal world to real-world to distinguish the physical world where
business associations have traditionally dwelt from the world of the blockchain. “Real world”
implies that the blockchain is fake or imaginary.
25 See, e.g., Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 202(a) (1997) [hereinafter RUPA]; Delaware
Limited Liability Company Act § 18-201(a) (2012) [hereinafter DLLCA].
26 E.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV.
80, 108 (1991) (“Any company that has not been formally organized under a nonpartnership
statute could be considered a partnership.”); Paul R. Tremblay, The Ethics of Representing
Founders, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 267, 276 (2017) (“It is an elementary principle of
business organizations doctrine that a partnership arises by default, through an ‘association
of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit . . . whether or not the
persons intend to form a partnership.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting RUPA § 202(a)).
27 RUPA § 202(a).
20
21
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business association casebooks recount, the law is full of
entrepreneurs who unwittingly form partnerships. 28
The 2016 DAO was an association of two or more individuals to
carry on as co-owners a business for profit. It did not formally
organize under any state’s jurisdiction. Therefore, under business
association law it was a partnership, and its tokenholders in theory
faced unlimited liability. Also, in theory, the tokenholders’ creditors
had a claim on the DAO’s assets. But, as Part III will detail, the
blockchain is a pseudonymous space, and that pseudonymity,
coupled with the “code is law” 29 nature of the blockchain, provides
participants a kind of protection unavailable in the real world. Thus
the blockchain removes both the penalty and the default from the
workings of partnership law. The blockchain can, all by itself,
perform via contractual means what before now only organizational
law could do.
But the other edge of the sword remains. The incomplete
contracting literature reminds us that all contracts are
incomplete. 30 And so a question arises: When gaps appear in the
blockchain’s nexus of contracts, what will happen? The answer to
that question turns first, as Part IV explains, on the extent to which
an entity is organized strictly on the blockchain. If the entity exists
on the blockchain alone, then the law simply fails—it has no entry
point into the code. But as long as identifiable individuals organize
entities on the blockchain, a legal intervention point does exist—not
in the blockchain itself, but rather in the intersection of the
blockchain and the corporeal world. Sovereign states around the
globe are grappling with the question of how to regulate the
blockchain, necessarily focusing on this intersection as a legal
intervention point. 31 Securities law provides a prime example of

28 See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith & Cynthia A. Williams, Business Organizations: cases,
problems, and case studies (3rd ed. 2012).
29 Laurence Lessig, Code (2nd ed. 2006), http://codev2.cc/download+remix/Lessig-Codev2.
pdf.
30 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
31 Accord Andrew Nelson, Cryptocurrency Regulation in 2018: Where the World Stands
Right Now, BITCOINMAGAZINE.COM (Feb. 1, 2018, 2:42 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/ar
ticles/cryptocurrency-regulation-2018-where-world-stands-right-now/.
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such a legal intervention point on the blockchain—more precisely,
between the blockchain and the corporeal world. 32
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides an account of
business associations law as default law and the partnership form
as the default business organizational form. It focuses careful
attention on the various attributes scholars have identified as being
peculiar to business organizations that affirmatively organize as
corporations, limited liability companies, and the like: limited
liability and asset partitioning. Part II moves to the story of the
2016 DAO, describing its launch, governance, and the catastrophic
“hack” which led to its unwinding. It concludes that, under a
conventional business law analysis, the 2016 DAO was clearly a
partnership. However, Part III describes how the nature of the
blockchain frustrates the application of conventional business law.
Indeed, despite their partnership status, entities organized on the
blockchain itself enjoy de facto limited liability from contract claims,
and pseudonymity provides at least some protection from the
currently remote chance of tort claims. Part IV moves to discuss
potential legal intervention points.
Purely blockchain
organizations—with no identifiable human organizers—have no
legal intervention point, and thus can exist outside the law.
Nevertheless, DAOs are creating governance structures that
replicate some of the mandatory and default rules of corporeal law,
and thus are creating intervention points of their own. These are
not legal intervention points, susceptible to governmental action,
but they are points where private ordering can intervene to fill the
gaps that arise in the inevitably incomplete contract. In contrast,
most ICOs, are currently being launched by identifiable human
32 The Securities and Exchange Commission issued a July 2017 report labeling the 2016 DAO
tokens securities under the Howey test, “a common enterprise with profits derived solely from
the efforts of others.” If the tokens are securities, then the DAO’s organizers violated U.S.
securities laws by conducting a public offering without registering with the SEC or qualifying
for an exemption from registration. Because the 2016 DAO was unwound, the SEC did not
prosecute the 2016 DAO organizers. But the SEC has engaged in subsequent enforcement
actions. See SEC Exposes Two Initial Coin Offerings Purportedly Backed by Real Estate and
Diamonds, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 29, 2017), https://
www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-185-0; Complaint, Securities and Exchange Commission
v. Plexcorps, et al., CV17-7007, https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2017/comp-pr2017219.pdf; Order, In re Minchee, Inc., (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/
33-10445.pdf.https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10 445.pdf.
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organizers, and the law is quite prominently intervening to shape
them.
I. ORGANIZATIONAL LAW AS A GAP FILLER
A. THE FIRM AS AN INCOMPLETE CONTRACT

This Article will focus on the blockchain’s interaction with the
default rules supplied by business associations law, but a brief
review of the more general incomplete-contracting literature is in
order.
A complete contract would anticipate every possible
contingency—an impossible feat: “There is an infinite number of
possible future states and a very large set of possible partner types.
When the sum of possible states and partner types is infinite and
contracting is costly, contracts must contain gaps. Parties cannot
write contracts about everything.” 33 Given that gaps are inevitable,
the question becomes how best to fill them. The incompletecontracting literature weighs such issues as how to factor in the
possibility of litigation, 34 renegotiation, judicial competence, 35 and
whether gap-filling rules should be “majoritarian” or “penalty
default” (of which more in a moment). The focus of this Part,
however, is on how the incomplete contracting literature relates to
business forms.
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel developed a “contractual
way of looking at the corporation.” 36 Their insight is simple and
profound: the myriad choices that entrepreneurs make when
structuring a corporation form a web of contracts, both by explicit
private ordering and by implicit use of the default rules and the
This corporation-as-contract
principles of corporate law. 37
33 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541, 595 (2003).
34 Robert E. Scott, George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE
L.J. 814, 816 (2006).
35 Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994).
36 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1433 (1989).
37 Id. at 1418 (“The corporation is a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts, and
corporate law enables the participants to select the optimal arrangement for the many
different sets of risks and opportunities that are available in a large economy.”) .
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metaphor formed the basis of an influential book, The Economic
Structure of Corporate Law, in which the authors offered
justifications for corporate-law doctrine based on economically
efficient default rules.
Fiduciary duty offers a familiar example of such a default
principle. 38 Each decision a firm’s executives make impacts the
value of the firm. No explicit contract could govern all these
decisions effectively. Such a contract “would be hopelessly
incomplete, given the myriad complex decisions that firm managers
must make in order to run the company. Instead, corporate
fiduciary duty supplies a general gap-filling standard: firm
managers should run the firm for shareholders’ benefit.” 39
The bulk of the Economic Structure of Corporate Law analyzes
other examples of corporate law contractual terms, such as the
business judgment rule, procedures regarding derivative suits,
appraisal remedies, laws related to corporate control transactions,
and more. Corporate law’s function, in short, is
a set of terms available off-the-rack so that participants
in corporate ventures can save the cost of contracting.
There are lots of terms, such as rules for voting,
establishing quorums, and so on, that almost everyone
will want to adopt. Corporate codes and existing judicial
decisions supply these terms “for free” to every
corporation, enabling the venturers to concentrate on
matters that are specific to their undertaking. Even
when they work through all the issues they expect will
arise, they are apt to miss something. All sorts of
complexities will arise later. Corporate law-and in
particular the fiduciary principle enforced by courtsfills in the blanks and oversights with the terms that
people would have bargained for had they anticipated

Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 201 (2004).
Frederick Tung, Gap Filling in the Zone of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 607, 612
(2007).
38
39
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the problems and been able to transact costlessly in
advance. 40
In sum, corporate law fills the gaps of the necessarily incomplete
contract of the corporation.
But the firm need not necessarily take the corporate form. For
the metaphor of the firm as a nexus-of-contracts to apply, a
corporation need not be at its center. As Easterbrook and Fischel
point out, the first choice entrepreneurs make is to select a business
form. 41 Today’s would-be entrepreneurs face a relatively settled
menu of firm choices: the partnership, the corporation, the limited
partnership, the limited liability partnership, the limited liability
company (LLC) and, more recently, the benefit corporation and its
cousins. 42 These forms are not all created equal. The default
organizations rules have always tilted in favor of the limited
liability forms, and against the partnership. 43 Indeed, the law uses
default rules to push entrepreneurs to the limited liability entity
forms. 44 Easterbrook and Fischel urged that these gap-fillers those
forms afford are useful, but other scholars have made a more
emphatic argument for them: only organizational law can create
impermeable barriers to protect the firm’ participants from claims
outside the firm. 45
To understand the penalty default nature of the partnership
form, one should start with a basic observation: In order to form a
limited liability entity like a corporation or LLC, entrepreneurs
must file required paperwork and pay a fee to the state under whose
laws they intend to organize. 46 Once the entrepreneur receives
40 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1444–45 (1989).
41 Id. at 1417 (“Consider the domain of choice. The founders and managers of a firm choose
whether to organize as a corporation, trust, partnership, mutual or cooperative.”).
42 The flexible purpose corporation and L3C. Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate
Governance: What History Can Teach Us, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 19 (2004).
43 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 89 (1985).
44 Id.
45 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L.J. 387 (2000).
46 See, e.g., Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act § 201(a) (2012) [hereinafter
RULLCA]; DLLCA § 18-201(a).
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confirmation of a successful filing, the limited liability entity is
formed. 47 In contrast, the partnership, “probably the oldest form of
business organization,” 48 does not require any official filing with a
government entity or agency. All that the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act requires for partnership formation is “the
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit.” 49 Parties can create partnerships without even
intending to do so. 50 Law school casebooks for the Business
Associations course generally feature the story of hapless partners
who formed a partnership without even knowing that they had done
so. 51 All two people need to do is carry on as co-owners a business
for profit—they need not even utter the words “partner” or
“partnership” to be treated as such by the law. 52 Thus, the general
partnership is the default form. 53
What’s more, the default form is unstable and porous, bringing
with it considerable risks both to the individual and to the entity
itself. The partnership form offers unlimited liability, meaning that
the firm’s creditors can reach the assets of its owners. 54 While a
corporation’s shareholder can lose the full amount of her
investment, her losses are capped at that amount. 55 In contrast, a
See, e.g., 8 Del. C. § 103.
Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 409 (2003) (citing Robert W.
Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 428 (1987)).
49 RUPA § 202(a).
50 For example, the receipt of profits raises a presumption of partnership under RUPA §
202(c)(3).
51 See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith & Cynthia A. Williams, Business Organizations: cases,
problems, and case studies (3rd ed. 2012).
52 See supra note 49.
53 E.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV.
80, 108 (1991) (“Any company that has not been formally organized under a nonpartnership
statute could be considered a partnership.”); Paul R. Tremblay, The Ethics of Representing
Founders, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 267, 276 (2017) (“It is an elementary principle of
business organizations doctrine that a partnership arises by default, through an ‘association
of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit . . . whether or not the
persons intend to form a partnership.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting RUPA § 202(a)).
54 RUPA § 306; Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 192 (2004).
55 Setting aside the risk of the corporate veil being pierced, a relatively rare occurrence
when the corporate form is not sufficiently respected. Frank H. Easterbrook, Limited
Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985) (“Courts occasionally allow
creditors to ‘pierce the corporate veil,’ which means that shareholders must satisfy creditors’
47
48
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partner of a general partnership can invest only $1,000, yet risks
being jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the
partnership’s losses. 56
General partnerships are also fragile creatures. The voluntary
exit of a single partner triggers dissolution of the entire
partnership. 57 Even worse, the creditors of any individual owner
have a claim on the firm’s assets as well—and traditionally can
trigger dissolution to liquidate them. 58 The only protection the
partnership form offers its partners is “weak entity shielding”: firm
creditors have priority in the partnership assets over the personal
creditors. 59 Still, the personal creditors of investors do have a claim
on partnership assets, and have the power to dissolve the firm
entirely. 60 Contracting to protect the firm from the claims of
individual partners’ creditors was difficult in practice because of
moral hazard. 61
The partnership form offers other default rules that differ greatly
from the more familiar corporate framework. For example, the
default partnership governance structure allots to each and every
partner an equal vote—whether they contribute $100 or
$1,000,000. 62 Majority vote governs ordinary partnership decisions,
and a unanimous vote is required for extraordinary ones. 63 One’s
investment in a partnership is not freely transferable—a partner
claims. ‘Piercing’ seems to happen freakishly. Like lightning, it is rare, severe, and
unprincipled.”).
56 While it is true that partnerships also enjoy the benefit of pass-through taxation, this
feature provides small comfort when one considers that the LLC form can furnish the same
benefit while affording limited liability and asset segregation to boot.
57 RUPA § 801.
58 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1339 (2006).
59 Id. at 1337-38.
60 Id. at 1391.
Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, this liquidation right is
transformed into a mandatory buyout, where the creditors can require the firm to buy out the
bankruptcy partner’s interest. RUPA §§ 401(h), 701. See also Uniform Partnership Act §
18(e) [hereinafter UPA].
61 RUPA § 701. In theory, each partner could negotiate a waiver preventing each of his or
her personal creditors from recourse to the partnership, but each individual partner would
be tempted to omit the waiver in order to lower the cost of credit. Henry Hansmann, Reinier
Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 134041 (2006).
62 UPA § 9; RUPA § 401.
63 UPA § 9; RUPA § 401.
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may only sell her share with the consent of all other partners. 64
While these rules may be unpalatable, parties can contract around
them with relative ease. Those unsuspecting partners in the
casebooks serve as cautionary tales to aspiring lawyers and
entrepreneurs because of the two big risks partners cannot contract
out of: unlimited liability and inherent entity instability.
The limited liability forms (and for simplicity’s sake, I will use
the corporate form as a stand-in for all of these forms) in contrast,
mean more protection and stability than a partnership can afford.
Most notably, the corporate form offers limited liability: while
owners of these forms may lose money, their losses are capped at
the amount they have invested in the firm. 65 Their personal assets
are not “on the hook,” as they are in the partnership form.
Conversely, while a bankrupt shareholder will have to surrender
her shares to her personal creditors, those creditors will have no
recourse or rights with respect to the corporation itself. 66
We can thus call the fact that the law supplies partnership as the
default business organizational form a “penalty default” rule. The
question as to what kind of default rules the law should supply to
fill the gaps in incomplete contracts is a crucial one. Easterbrook
and Fischel argued for majoritarian gap rules that supply terms
that the parties would generally have bargained for had they
considered a particular eventuality. 67 The term “penalty default
rules,” which was coined by Ayres and Gertner, denotes gap-filling
rules that, rather than follow majoritarian preferences, impose
penalties. 68 In theory, the specter of this penalty motivates the

RUPA § 401.
See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 189 (2004); 6
Del. C. § 18-303. While the LLC and other new forms also offer many of these features, for
the sake of simplicity I focus solely on the corporate form.
66 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1340 (2006). As an example of other attractive features of corporate
law, in the corporate form, management is centralized in a board of directors. Larry E.
Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 188 (2004). Shares are freely
transferable, and the death or exit of its owners does not dissolve the corporation. Larry E.
Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 189 (2004)
67 Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 187-88 (2004).
68 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
64
65
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affected party to affirmatively state her preference, for fear of
otherwise living with the penalty the law supplies.
Couple the many negative, or at least counter-intuitive features
of partnership law, plus the fact that it is the default business
association form, and we can characterize the partnership as a
species of penalty default rule—a penalty default business form, if
you will. A trap for the unwary, it incentivizes people to
affirmatively make their preferences—for limited liability, entity
stability, or voting rules—known by opting into a limited liability
form. Indeed, in a piece defending the existence of penalty default
rules in real life, Ayres himself referred to the partnership as a
species of penalty default:
[I]t is possible to understand the general partnership as
a “penalty default.” That is, many, if not most,
organizers of business firms may prefer characteristics
that cannot be achieved through a general partnership;
the structure of general partnership law creates
incentives to choose other organizational forms. 69
To the extent that partnership law offers entrepreneurs a penalty
default, they can opt out of it in two different ways. First, there are
certain default partnership rules—such as, for example, the
democratic one-partner-one-vote rule—that they can contract out of
amongst themselves. 70 But there are partnership features that one
can only obtain, or most cheaply obtain, by way of adopting one of
the limited liability forms. 71
Indeed, as corporate law scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s
came to be dominated by the nexus of contracts metaphor, 72
corporate law scholars searched for the raison d’etre of the business
69 Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh: There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
589, 604–05 (2006) (alteration in original) (citing Deborah A. DeMott, Transatlantic
Perspectives on Partnership Law: Risk and Instability, 26 J. CORP. L. 879 (2001)).
70 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1392 (2006).
71 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L.J. 387, 429 (2000).
72 William W. Bratton, Jr., Nexus of Contracts Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 407, 409 (1989) (“This notion has achieved wide currency, showing up even
in contexts in which the rest of the theory has little or no influence.”).
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entity. This question arises anew when we confront the blockchain’s
world of self-enforcing contracts. Before approaching that question,
background on the debate about what, if anything, corporate law
provides that contract alone cannot will provide context for an
appreciation of the unique promise of the blockchain for business
associations.
Corporate and business law scholars have written extensively on
different characteristics of the corporate form, each trying to
identify the essential function of organization law. 73 These scholars
have articulated important theories, arguing that there are unique
features of entity law in general, and corporate law in particular
that cannot be replicated by contract alone. 74
The main contenders for the “difference” of corporate law are
partitioning of assets, and limited liability. 75 These functions, it is
argued, cannot be achieved except through the corporate form. 76
Interestingly, all of these theories require entity form not for the
purposes of those inside the entity—who can presumably deal with
their concerns via contract. Instead, it is the threat of those outside
the firm, who cannot be reliably bound by contract that necessitates
the corporate form. 77 The common thread in all of these
justifications for the uniqueness of the corporate form is a basic
limitation of traditional organizational law: it cannot reliably bind
intra-firm assets for the protection of outside creditors, walling
them off from the claims of its owners’ creditors (entity shielding, a
form of asset partitioning). 78 Nor can it reliably protect investorowners from the claims of the firm’s own creditors’ claims (limited
liability). 79 Nor can it dependably safeguard the firm assets against
liquidation, either voluntarily from one of the owners or
involuntarily at the behest of an owner’s creditors (lock-in). 80
73 See generally, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000).
74 Id. at 435.
75 Id. at 433.
76 Id. at 432-35.
77 Id. at 433.
78 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (2006).
79 Id. at 1340.
80 Id.
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Corporate law alone can shield assets and aggregate claims in the
way necessary to facilitate capital formation and growth. 81
Because the blockchain offers a self-enforcing contract that
credibly binds and segregates assets, it has the potential to solve
the problems of asset-partitioning and limited liability by means of
contract alone. By laying bare all of its contracts on the blockchain,
it drastically reduces the risk that third parties from outside the
firm can make claims upon it. This transparency represents its
challenge to business associations law: it can use contract to provide
corporate-like functions in a new way. It is also nearly impervious
to the default-supplying function that is so basic to business
associations law, but that holds as much in the way of problem as
in the way of promise. Before we can explore the general default
function of business association law, however, let’s review the
different features of the corporate form scholars have identified as
irreplicable by contractual means alone.
1. Limited Liability. Traditionally, the corporation’s chief virtue
was seen to lie in the unique protection against liability that it
provides for shareholders. 82 Protecting the corporation’s owners
from its debts was an innovation designed to entice wary outside
investors to risk their capital in new ventures. In the partnership
form, investors were on the hook for any and all of the corporation’s
debts. In contrast, the corporation’s limited liability protections
effectively capped investor losses at the amount of capital
invested. 83

81 Notably, the partnership form’s drawbacks are the mirror image of features posited as
the defining characteristics of the corporate form: 1) the partnership’s creditors can reach the
assets of its partner owners; 2) the individual partners’ creditors can reach the assets of the
firm, to the point of liquidating it, and 3) any partner’s exit can force liquidation. Margaret
M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the
Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 409-12 (2003).
82 Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 193 (2004) (“Thus, it
has been said that ‘limitation or elimination of liability of the shareholders is not merely the
chief single advantage of a business corporation but it is the advantage which in the
estimation of legislatures and also in the estimation of the public is of more importance than
all the other advantages put together. It is the main thing.’”) (citation omitted).
83 Id. at 192.
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While limited liability is traditionally viewed as a chief attraction
of the corporate form, some scholars have questioned this premise. 84
At first blush, it might seem that because contract law is essentially
enforceable only between the two contracting parties, the
contractual relationship on its own cannot shield a party from the
claims of the creditors of its counterparty. 85 The limited liability
provided by the corporate form, via the asset partitioning
mechanism, alone can provide a wall that shields the corporation’s
shareholders from corporate creditors and the corporation from its
shareholders’ creditors. 86 Yet unlike entity shielding, owner
shielding can be obtained via contract “by requiring firm agents
(including the owners themselves when they act on behalf of the
firm) to negotiate clauses in the firm's contracts whereby firm
creditors agree to limit or waive their right to levy on the owners’
personal assets.” 87
Such contractual provisions would, however, be ineffective with
respect to tort claims against the firm. Tort claimants by definition
are free from any contractual limitation on their power to levy on
the firm investor assets (because tort victims do not generally
anticipate falling victim to future torts, particularly those inflicted
upon them by specific tortfeasors). 88 Tort claimants thus would
remain a constant threat for businesses that choose not to use the
corporate form. 89 As a result, only business associations law, by
84 Margaret Blair offers a historically based critique of the proposition that limited liability
is the defining characteristic of the corporate form, observing that: “Although limited liability
became one of the defining characteristics of the corporate form in the early and midtwentieth century, many early corporations were organized under charters that did not grant
limited liability.” Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for
Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 437 (2003).
85 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L.J. 387, 407 (2000).
86 Id.
87 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1341 (2006). Firm owners can enhance the effectiveness of this
strategy by using a term such as “limited” in the firm’s name to signal clearly to third parties
that firm agents act without the authority to bind the owners’ personal assets. Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J.
387, 430 (2000).
88 Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 193 (2004).
89 John Morley has argued that, as a historical matter, this theoretical vulnerability to tort
claims had little practical effect because “[t]ort liability was extremely rare prior to the midnineteenth century, and the doctrines of tort law remained poorly developed up through at
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providing state-provided limitation of liability from both a firm’s
tort creditors and its contract creditors, affords entrepreneurs with
indemnity from losses in excess of initial investments. 90
While limited liability or “owner shielding” focuses on the risk
that the entity’s liabilities pose to investors, another candidate for
the key defining characteristic of corporate law flips that rationale
on its head. It focuses not on the risks that the debts of the entity
pose to its owners, but instead on the risks that the debts of
individual owners pose to the entity itself.
2. Asset Partitioning. Several scholars have focused on the
corporate form’s unique ability to insulate firm assets from the
claims of the investors’ creditors. In particular, Hansmann,
Kraakman and Squire deem this characteristic of the corporate
form to be a feature contract law cannot replicate. 91 Triantis
highlights the ability of the firm to match, by means of subsidiaries,
particular assets to the claims of particular creditors. 92 And Blair
focuses on the fact that, historically, only the corporate form allowed
for permanence from claims within and outside the firm. 93
According to Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire the “universal
characteristic” of modern business firms is “entity shielding,” 94 that
is, “the legal power to commit assets that bond their agreements
with their creditors and, correlatively, to shield those assets from
least the early twentieth century. John Morley, The Common Law Corporation: The Power
of the Trust in Anglo-American Business History, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2145, 2182 (2016)
(citations omitted). He similarly discounts potential entity tax liability as a threat to wouldbe owners: “Tax liability was also relatively insignificant. Although the United Kingdom
adopted a corporate income tax in 1803, its rates remained low for at least a century. And the
United States did not successfully tax corporate income until 1909—even then, the rates were
very low by modern standards.” Id.
90 Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 193 (2004).
91 See generally, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the
Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335 (2006).
92 George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of
Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1102, 1106 (2004).
93 Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 429 (2003).
94 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1336 (2006) (replacing the earlier (and clunkier) “affirmative asset
partitioning” Hansmann and Kraakman used in their prior article, The Essential Role of
Organizational Law) (citing Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 393-95 (2000)).
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the claims of their owners’ personal creditors.” 95 These scholars
deem it “practically impossible” to use contract to create effective
entity shielding because each owner would have to require his or
her personal creditors to waive any claims on firm assets. 96 If each
partner were to negotiate a waiver in all contracts with each of his
or her personal creditors, then in theory contractual entity shielding
might be possible. But such a solution would entail not only high
transaction costs but also, and more importantly, impose a high
degree of moral hazard. 97 In particular, while having these waivers
in place would benefit firm owners collectively by reducing
borrowing costs, “each waiver would also increase personal
borrowing costs, and that cost would be borne entirely by the owner
who negotiated the waiver. Each owner would thus face an
incentive to act opportunistically by omitting the waivers from
personal dealings.” 98 Policing the omission of such waivers would
prove difficult, particularly as the number of owners increases.
“The policing problem is further compounded if ownership shares
are freely transferable. These problems can be solved only by
impairing the rights of personal creditors without their contractual
consent (and often even without notice). Doing that requires a
special rule of property law for assets committed to the firm.” 99 They
conclude that “[e]ntity law provides that rule.” 100 Thus, Hansmann,
Kraakman, and Squire conclude that it is entity shielding, not
owner shielding that is the “sine qua non” of the legal entity. 101
Another scholar, George Triantis, focuses on other aspects of
asset partitioning as unique to the corporate form. He posits that
corporate law functions to demarcate firm boundaries. 102 According
to him, internal capital markets increase the flexibility and
discretion of corporate managers to allocate capital between
projects, and the corporate form’s ability to separate these internal
Id.
Id. at 1340.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1340-41.
100 Id. at 1341.
101 Id. at 1338.
102 See generally, George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal
Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1102 (2004).
95
96
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capital markets into distinct entities via subsidiaries creates
“barriers to capital movements across the boundaries of such
entities, even when they are subject to common control.” 103 The
corporate form alone can create these durable divisions in the
corporate family.
Finally, Margaret Blair argues that the corporation’s unique
ability to lock in capital is what sets it apart as a historical matter,
“When a corporation is formed, initial investors not only commit a
pool of capital to be used in the business, but they also yield control
over the business assets and activities to a board of directors that is
legally independent of both shareholders and managers.” 104 Blair
argues that this surrender of legal control rights by equity investors
and other corporate participants facilitates efficient team
production. 105 The general partnership form, in contrast, is
inherently unstable because the voluntary exit of any individual
triggers the dissolution of the firm. 106
3. Exceptions that Prove the Rule. Thus far, I have characterized
the partnership form is a kind of penalty-default organizational
form, that the existence of which serves to motivate entrepreneurs
to opt for other business forms. Historically, this penalty default
has forced firms into a corporate-like form, illustrating the limits of
contract alone. Scholars like Hansmann, Kraakman, Squire,
Triantis, and Blair have asserted various theories for what
characteristic makes limited liability entities special, and the main
contenders are limited liability, entity shielding and asset
Two scholars have recently challenged this
segregation. 107
narrative.
Looking back in time, John Morley recently made the case for the
trust as an early—and still viable—alternative to the corporate
form in American legal history. According to Morley, the trust form
resembles the corporation because it approximates the innovative
“legal technologies” of limited liability, legal personhood, and the

Id. at 1106.
Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 393 (2003).
105 Id.
106 See supra note 57.
107 See supra notes 60-71.
103
104
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opportunity to create tradable shares. 108 We have seen that the
entity shielding provided by the corporate form prevents the owners’
creditors from forcing the entity to liquidate. 109 In similar fashion,
the trust protects the trust’s beneficiaries from instability because
they transfer title of their property to the trust. 110 A borrower’s
creditor only has claims on the borrower’s property, and if title of
Blackacre has passed to a trust, it is shielded from the borrower’s
creditors because it is no longer technically the borrower’s property
at all. 111 This ancient and relatively simple mechanism is thus able
to provide entity shielding. Finally, the law evolved to give trust
beneficiaries limited liability from the claims of trust creditors and
other corporate-like features. 112 The main point for our purposes is
that the non-corporate form of the trust for centuries has exhibited
many of the supposedly unique features of the corporation.
Another modern business firm—the reciprocal insurance
exchange—fits the same mold. Andrew Verstein has described this
business structure as an example of “enterprise without entity.” 113
A reciprocal exchange is “an insurance enterprise in which all
insurance subscribers contract directly with one another, promising
to pay a share of any losses the others suffer.” 114 The unique world
of the reciprocal exchange provides “no legal entity at the
contractual core.” 115 Instead, “[a] thick braid of contracts unites a
circle of natural persons, each of whom participates as part of the
enterprise.” 116 Verstein argues that reciprocals have used a
combination of contract law and insurance regulation to achieve
asset partitioning. 117
108 John Morley, The Common Law Corporation: The Power of the Trust in Anglo-American
Business History, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2145, 2148 (2016).
109 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1391 (2006).
110 See supra note 108, at 2154.
111 See supra note 108, at 2169.
112 See supra note 108, at 2176-77. While trustees, the central governing body of the trust,
did sometimes face liability, so did contemporaneous corporate directors. See supra note 108,
at 2180.
113 See generally Andrew Verstein, Enterprise Without Entities, 116 MICH. L. REV. 247, 247
(2017).
114 Id. at 249.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 251.
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Perhaps these examples teach us that claims to corporate law
exceptionalism are, like Twain’s death, greatly exaggerated. 118 On
the other hand, these examples may prove the rule. Although the
“essential” corporate law features may be subject to duplication, the
real-world use of trusts and reciprocal exchanges to achieve these
goals is rare. In general, to avoid the penalty default of partnership,
entrepreneurs of have long opted for limited liability entities. 119
But a new technology, the blockchain, offers the potential to
change that. And critical steps in that direction have already taken
place.
II. THE 2016 DAO
This Part shifts attention to the blockchain, including by will
describing the 2016 DAO’s rise and fall in considerable detail. The
story is fascinating in its own right, but its importance for this
Article is twofold. First, it demonstrates the potential for business
associations to exist on the blockchain, using smart contracts to
effectuate the functions of business law. Without the constraints
imposed by ordinary legal rules, DAOs can structure contractual
relations in a way impossible in the corporeal world, unfettered by
partnership penalty default the law would otherwise impose. But
the story of the DAO also demonstrates, in vivid manner, the peril
of smart contracting. All contracts are necessarily incomplete. 120
The 2016 DAO is a cautionary tale about the limits of relying on a
“code is law” model when (as inevitably happens) gaps in the nexus
of contracts emerge without a legal intervention point on which the
law can work.
A. BACKGROUND

Blockchain technology, also called distributed ledger technology,
offers four primary and related benefits: it is decentralized, it is
118 Laura I. Appleman, Reports of Batson’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated: How the
Batson Doctrine Enforces A Normative Framework of Legal Ethics, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 607, 657
(2005).
119 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
120 Id.
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transparent, it is (or at least can be) anonymous, and it is nearly
impossible to manipulate. 121 Ledgers are an ancient method of
recording transactions—think clay tablets or papyrus. 122
Distributed ledgers are a record-keeping device that exist across a
large, shared network. 123 Each network participant’s computer (or
node) stores a copy of the ledger, which is simultaneously updated
This
across the network whenever any change occurs. 124
“distribution” is a key differentiator from typical “fiat” currency,
where a single trusted authority validates each transaction. 125
Instead of a central authority authenticating and communicating
transactions, each of the nodes independently verifies proposed
additions to the ledger, or blockchain. 126 If a majority of the nodes
verify the transaction, it is added to the blockchain. 127
Bitcoin, the first widely publicized blockchain, was simply a
virtual currency, facilitating simple purchases between parties. 128
But the next generation of blockchains were developed to layer
“smart contracts” on top of the virtual currencies they offered. 129
Ethereum is a prominent example of such a “smart contract”
blockchain that uses “ether” as a unit of currency. 130 The Ethereum
121 Patrick Murck, Who Controls the Blockchain?, HARV. BUS. REV. (April 19, 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/04/who-controls-the-blockchain (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
122 Nolan Bauerle, What is a Distributed Ledger?, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/in
formation/what-is-a-distributed-ledger/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Aleksander Bulkin, Explaining blockchain–how proof of work enables trustless
consensus, MEDIUM.COM (May 3, 2016), https://keepingstock.net/explaining-blockchain-howproof-of-work-enables-trustless-consensus-2abed27f0845 (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
127 Nolan Bauerle, What is a Distributed Ledger?, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/in
formation/what-is-a-distributed-ledger/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2018). Each blockchain devises
ways to authenticate and to reward the nodes for their work (e.g., mining), but these methods
are irrelevant for the purposes of this Article.
128 Bernard Marr, A Short History Of Bitcoin And Crypto Currency Everyone Should Read,
FORBES (Dec. 6, 2017, 12:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/12/06/ashort-history-of-bitcoin-and-crypto-currency-everyone-should-read/#5c19d1863f27.
129 Antonio Madeira, The DAO, The Hack, The Soft Fork and The Hard Fork,
CRYPTOCOMPARE (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-thehack-the-soft-fork-and-the-hard-fork/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2018).
130 Ethereum was launched by Ethereum and accepted bitcoin payment at its ICO in exchange
for a usage token running on a new protocol. Steven McKie, Understanding the Ethereum Token
Hype, BLOCKCHANNEL (June 14, 2017), https://medium.com/blockchannel/un derstanding-theethereum-ico-token-hype-429481278f45; Ameer Rosic, What is Ethereum? A Step-by-Step
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blockchain permits the central recording not just of an exchange,
but of contractual conditions and limits on the circumstances under
which an exchange can occur. 131 Indeed, while Bitcoin was designed
intentionally as a crypto-currency, Ethereum was created
specifically for users to develop new app designs to layer on top of
its blockchain to facilitate smart contracts. 132
The concept of a “smart contract” merits close attention. As a
historical matter, a contract is a promise that can be legally
enforced. 133 First-year contracts students learn the difference
between promised gifts, promises that are enforceable because
supported by consideration. In contrast, a “smart contract” is one
as to which enforcement is automatic, and does not depend on the
law for enforcement. 134 These contracts need not be high-tech—
Szabo, who first coined the term, used as his example the vending
machine. 135 On blockchains like Ethereum, a “smart contract”
generates an automatically enforceable promise, 136 but one
available without recourse to the law.
One of Ethereum’s founders participated in an ambitious effort
to use Ethereum’s blockchain to create a business organization—
although a business organization unlike any other. 137 He called it a
“decentralized autonomous organization,” or DAO. 138 In general,

Beginners Guide, BLOCKGEEKS, https://blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-ethereum/ (last visited
Jan. 26, 2018).
131 Steven McKie, Understanding the Ethereum Token Hype, BLOCKCHANNEL (June 14, 2017),
https://medium.com/blockchannel/understanding-the-ethereum-ico-token-hype-429481 278f45.
132 Bernard Marr, A Short History Of Bitcoin And Crypto Currency Everyone Should Read,
FORBES (Dec. 6, 2017, 12:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/12/06/ashort-history-of-bitcoin-and-crypto-currency-everyone-should-read/#5c19d1863f27.
133 1 Williston on Contracts § 1:1 (4th ed.).
134 Steven McKie, Understanding the Ethereum Token Hype, BLOCKCHANNEL (June 14,
2017), https://medium.com/blockchannel/understanding-the-ethereum-ico-token-hype-42948
1278f45
135 Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 323 (2017)
(citing Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks, FIRST
MONDAY (Sept. 1, 1997), http://ojphi.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469).
136 Patrick Murck, Who Controls the Blockchain?, HARV. BUS. REV. (April 19, 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/04/who-controls-the-blockchain (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
137 Antonio Madeira, The DAO, The Hack, The Soft Fork and The Hard Fork,
CRYPTOCOMPARE (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-thehack-the-soft-fork-and-the-hard-fork/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
138 Id.
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DAOs build upon two other concepts—autonomous agents and
decentralized organizations.
[I]n an autonomous agent, there is no necessary specific
human involvement at all . . . while some degree of
human effort might be necessary to build the hardware
that the agent runs on, there is no need for any humans
to exist that are aware of the agent’s existence. . . . One
example of an autonomous agent that already exists
today would be a computer virus. 139
Decentralized organizations are intended to replace corporate
organizations:
Instead of a hierarchical structure managed by a set of
humans interacting in person and controlling property
via the legal system, a decentralized organization
involves a set of humans interacting with each other
according to a protocol specified in code, and enforced
on the blockchain. A D[A]O may or may not make use
of the legal system for some protection of its physical
property, but even there such usage is secondary. 140
The first DAO launched on April 30, 2016 (“2016 DAO”). 141 Its
central idea, articulated in a white paper authored by Slock.it Chief
Technology Officer Christoph Jentzsch, 142 was to establish an
“automated investment fund.” 143 This began the 28-day “Creation”
phase, or funding phase. 144 During this phase “investors” could
139 Vitalik Buterin, DAOs, DACs, DAs and More: An Incomplete Terminology Guide,
ETHEREUM BLOG (May 6, 2014), https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacs-das-andmore-an-incomplete-terminology-guide/.
140 Id.
141 David Siegel, Understanding The DAO Attack, COINDESK (June 25, 2016), http://www.
coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-journalists/.
142 Our Team, SLOCK.IT, https://slock.it/team.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
143 The DAO of accrue, THE ECONOMIST: CRYPTO-INVESTING (May 19, 2016), https://www.
economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21699159-new-automated-investment-fund-hasattracted-stacks-digital-money-dao.
144 Kirk, How did “The DAO” come about? What was the process of its formation? ETHEREUM
STACK EXCHANGE (Aug. 23, 2016), https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questio ns/8250/howdid-the-dao-come-about-what-was-the-process-of-its-formation.
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send ether to the 2016 DAO’s account on Ethereum, with early
investors receiving more tokens for their ether than subsequent
investors. 145 The 2016 DAO then converted ether to DAO tokens, 146
which
were
“divisible,
indistinguishable”
and
“freely
147
The 2016 DAO initial offering was a tremendous
transferable.”
success. It raised over $150 million, attracting almost 14% of all
ether tokens then in existence. 148
The DAO’s organizers took great pains to ensure that it was, in
fact, decentralized. The DAO’s token creation code was open source
code, where anyone could copy or modify the original code, and it
was written by the Slock.it team. 149 Due to concerns over the
145 Antonio Madeira, How Does an ICO Work, CRYPTOCOMPARE (Jan. 15, 2018), https://
www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/how-does-an-ico-work/.
146 Id. See also SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DAO 21(A) REPORT, No. 81207
(July 25, 2017), at 6, https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf (last visited
Feb. 25, 2018). (“The token price fluctuated in a range of approximately 1 to 1.5 ETH per 100
DAO Tokens, depending on when the tokens were purchased during the Offering Period.”).
147 Christoph
Jentzsch, DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION TO
AUTOMATE GOVERNANCE 2, https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf (last
visited Feb. 2, 2018).
148 Andrew Tar, SEC Ruling on the DAO and ICO, Explained, COINTELEGRAPH (July 27,
2017), https://cointelegraph.com/explained/sec-ruling-on-the-dao-and-ico-explained (last visited
Feb. 15, 2018). Accounts of the distribution of tokens across accounts varies. According to one
source, the largest owner of DAO tokens owned only up to 4% and the top 100 owners owned
only 46%. Antonio Madeira, The DAO, The Hack, The Soft Fork and The Hard Fork,
CRYPTOCOMPARE (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-thehack-the-soft-fork-and-the-hard-fork/. Another describes the number of investors and total
investment as more concentrated: “Investments arrived from about 22,500 different Internet
addresses, but the same people could be using multiple address. Jentzsch guesses about 10,000
individual investors in all have contributed to the project. A few individuals seem to have an
especially great interest in the project: About half of the $168 million came from around 70
addresses.” Cade Metz, THE BIGGEST CROWDFUNDING PROJECT EVER—THE DAO—
IS KIND OF A MESS, WIRED (June 6, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/ 2016/06/biggestcrowdfunding-project-ever-dao-mess/. In part due to concerns about the adverse effects on
intense concentration of ownership, the code itself was added to Ethereum by various
anonymous sources, one of these was picked randomly to become the address of the 2016 DAO
and the Creation phase, or funding phase as described above, began. Christoph Jentzsch, The
History of the DAO and Lessons Learned, SLOCK.IT BLOG (Aug. 24, 2016),
https://blog.slock.it/the-history-of-the-dao-and-lessons-learned-d06740f8cfa5 (“After the release
of the Framework code version 1.0, multiple DAOs were immediately deployed to the Ethereum
Blockchain by several individuals. One address was chosen at random by the community, and
the creation of what will be known as ‘The DAO’ began.”).
149 Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) Framework, GITHUB, https://github.
com/slockit/DAO (last visited Feb. 24, 2018) (“We are making the Standard DAO Framework
we developed free and open source, so it can be reused by anyone wishing to put together a
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creation of a centralized system, “the Slock.it team got behind an
effort to release the code to the wild and thus facilitate the
possibility of a “pure DAO” rather than a Slock.it DAO. . . . A Slock.it
DAO would not have been a “true” DAO as it would have been
excessively centralized.” 150
Integral to the promise of the 2016 DAO was that it was truly an
autonomous organization. Taking as a guide Lessig’s famous
precept that “the code is the law,” 151 the organizers envisioned a
world where, once the 2016 DAO was up and running, it would
continue without any modifications. Its website stated “The terms
of The DAO Creation are set forth in the smart contract code
existing on the Ethereum blockchain at 0xbb9bc244d798123fde783
fcc1c72d3bb8c189413. Nothing in this explanation of terms or in
any other document or communication may modify or add any
additional obligations or guarantees beyond those set forth in The
DAO’s code.” 152 In the film version of this article, cue the foreboding
music.
B. GOVERNANCE OF THE 2016 DAO

Tokens gave DAO tokenholders both ownership and property
rights. 153 Much as in the corporate form, each token represented
voting power, and thus the holder of more tokens had a larger say
in governance than the holder of fewer tokens (as opposed to the
default one-partner, one-vote apportionment of the partnership
form). 154 The primary voting function was anticipated to be for
specific proposals, to be funded with the ether the DAO held. 155

transparent organization where governance and decision making systems are immutably
programmed in the Ethereum blockchain.”).
150 Redakcja, SundayInterview. How to revolutionize sharing economy? BITHUB.PL (Sept.
10, 2017), https://bithub.pl/typ/sundayinterview-how-revolutionize-sharing-economy/.
151 See supra note 29.
152 chris4210, An Open Letter To the DAO and the Ethereum community, STEEMIT, https://
steemit.com/ethereum/@chris4210/an-open-letter-to-the-dao-and-the-ethereum-community
(last visited Jan. 28, 2018).
153 Christoph
Jentzsch, DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION TO
AUTOMATE GOVERNANCE 2, https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf (last
visited Feb. 2, 2018).
154 Id. at 1-2.
155 Id. at 2.
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While the proponents of the DAO point to its decentralized
nature, the structure of the DAO itself was projected to make use of
“curators” and “contractors.” 156 Curators were to control the
addition of smart contracts, or project proposals, to the DAO by
contractors, who would complete the approved project proposals in
exchange for ether from the DAO. 157 Any tokenholder could submit
a proposal to become a contractor for the 2016 DAO by writing a
smart contract and publishing it on the blockchain, and describing
its details on the DAO website. 158 Additionally, it had to pay an
ether deposit that it would forfeit if the proposal failed to achieve a
An early proposal, from the Slock.it
quorum of tokenholders. 159
team itself, to create a physical lock that can be opened remotely, to
allow Airbnb style access to homes for rent. 160
After submitting a proposal, the aspiring contractor would wait
for a curator to verify that any contract code submitted by a
prospective contractor did in fact match the contract as published
on the blockchain, and to verify that the proposal came from an
identified person or organization. 161 Curators thus controlled the
addition of smart contracts, or project proposals, to the 2016 DAO
by contractors. The curators controlled the whitelist of those
contractors authorized to receive ether from the DAO. The 2016
DAO boasted of having as curators “the best and brightest
developers at Ethereum.” 162

Id. at 1-2.
Id.
158 Christoph
Jentzsch, DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION TO
AUTOMATE GOVERNANCE 2, https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf (last
visited Feb. 2, 2018).
159 Id.
160 Ian Allison, Ethereum-based Slock.it reveals first ever lock opened with money,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ethereum-basedslock-reveals-first-ever-lock-opened-money-1527014; Stephan Tual, Decentralized Smart
Devices with Stephan Tual from Slock.it, POSTSCAPES (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.postscap
es.com/iot-voices/interviews/smart-devices-ethereum-stephan-tual/.
161 Christoph
Jentzsch, DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION TO
AUTOMATE GOVERNANCE 2-3, https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf (last
visited Feb. 2, 2018).
162 Ethereum’s New DAO Looks to Turn Businesses Into Decentralized Code, BITCONNECT
(May 2, 2016), https://bitconnect.co/bitcoin-news/139/ethereums-new-dao-looks-to-turn-busi
nesses-into-decentralized-code.
156
157
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After being approved by a curator for the whitelist, a debate
period of a minimum of two weeks would allow for the community
to debate and vote on the proposal. 163 After the debate period
concluded, any tokenholder could require the DAO to verify that
quorum was reached and a majority of votes were cast in favor of
the proposal. 164 If a tokenholder disagreed with a proposal of the
DAO, he or she would vote against the proposal. 165
The role of the curators in the 2016 DAO was controversial, and
subject to criticism. One potential problem was that the curators
had approval over contractor proposals before they were put up to a
tokenholder vote. 166 This power was put in place primarily as a
diligence function, because the DAO smart contract could not on its
own separate genuine “real world” proposals from fake ones, but it
also allowed for curators to favor companies they preferred. 167
Curators could also affect the result by choosing the order that
different proposals were put forward to the token holders, favoring
certain deals by submitting them to tokenholder vote first. 168
The 2016 DAO organizers defended the use of curators, saying
that they merely served an administrative function. 169 They also
claimed that there was an additional check on the curators’ control
because the DAO selected curators via vote, adding an element of
163 Christoph
Jentzsch, DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION TO
AUTOMATE GOVERNANCE 2, https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf (last
visited Feb. 2, 2018).
164 Quorum requirements were initially set at 20%, unless a proposal was for the transfer
of all ether the DAO had ever received and was then set at 53.33%. Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 3.
168 Id. at 2-3.
169 An early Curator, Gavin Would, described his role as “trivial and entirely algorithmic —
no judgement whatsoever is required. They exist purely as a means of identity-verification.
They remain in their role only at the sufferance of the DAO stakeholders and may be replaced
at any time and for any reason. They have no power of oversight. The ‘curators’ are not
founders and being a ‘curator’ should not be taken as an endorsement of the DAO. As a
‘curator’, I never had any intention of offering advice to users on which projects they fund.
Many (myself included) had no role in its creation over and above offering technical insight
into Christoph’s whitepaper: I was not involved in the conception or creation of the DAO. I
agreed to the role in order to support this exciting project in its early stages in the extremely
limited scope of identity verification primarily because it is autonomous: it needs nothing
more!” Gav Would, Why I’ve Resigned as a Curator of the DAO, MEDIUM (May 13, 2016),
https://medium.com/@gavofyork/why-ive-resigned-as-a-curator-of-the-dao-238528fbd447.
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democracy. 170 However, Jentzsch’s white paper itself observed that
limiting the DAO to one curator would give that individual
“considerable power.” 171
Notably, the 2016 DAO organizers were relatively sophisticated
in their governance analysis. One marker of such sophistication
was understanding the potential perils posed to the minority.
Jentzsch formalized protection for the minority investors from what
he called a “majority robs minority attack” by creating an exit
mechanism. 172 As he points out, once capital is invested, the
minority becomes vulnerable to majority oppression “by changing
governance and ownership rules after DAO formation.
For
example, an attacker with 51% of the tokens, acquired ether during
the fueling period or created afterwards, could make a proposal to
send all the funds to themselves. Since they would hold the majority
of the tokens, they would always be able to pass their proposals.” 173
Jentzsch proposed a creative mechanism to protect the minority
from this type of oppression: a split. 174 If a tokenholder disagreed
with a proposal that the majority proposed, or simply wanted to
withdraw its ether before the proposal was funded, it could propose
to form a new DAO, termed a “split-DAO” or “child DAO.” 175 Any
tokenholders that voted for the proposal could move their portion of
the ether to the new DAO with a new proposed curator. 176 There
was no quorum requirement, allowing any single token holder to
exit the DAO on his or her own. Split proposals took seven days to
‘mature’ and get participants in—seven days less than the two week
minimum proposal period, to ensure that token holders could
retrieve their funds before a “potentially malicious” proposal was
170 Alexis Roussel, The DAO, the Curators: Evaluating and mitigating the legal risks,
BITY.COM (May 14, 2016), https://blog.bity.com/2016/05/14/the-dao-the-curators-evaluatingand-mitigating-the-legal-risks/; Andrew Quentson, Are The DAO Curators Masters or
Janitors?, COINTELEGRAPH (June 12, 2016), https://cointelegraph.com/news/are-the-daocurators-masters-or-janitors.
171 Christoph
Jentzsch, DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION TO
AUTOMATE GOVERNANCE 2, https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf (last
visited Feb. 2, 2018).
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
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approved. 177 Any participants voting “yes” in the split would mean
that the ether controlled by the splitters would go into the splitDAO, paying out any accrued “reward” pro-rata to the splitters. 178
C. THE “HACK” AND HARD FORK

Ironically, the split-DAO mechanism intended to protect the
minority carried within it the seeds of the DAO’s undoing. On June
12, Slock.it member and Ethereum co-founder, Stephen Taul,
announced that a “recursive call bug” was found in the DAO’s
code. 179 In essence, the problem was that it allowed a requester of
tokens to receive tokens in a split DAO without updating the
requester’s balance before the tokens were sent. 180 Because the
requester’s balance was not updated until the end of the string of
code, the splitter could repeat the request for additional tokens
before his or her balance was updated and thus, continue to receive
tokens. 181 It would be as if a bank customer could take out funds
from an ATM without her checking account updating to reflect the
withdrawal. The concerns over this bug proved fatal when, on June
17, someone took advantage of the recursive bug and siphoned $50
million of ether into a split-DAO. 182
While most media outlets characterized this attack as a “hack,”
an open letter purporting to be from the perpetrator of the June 17
attack, addressed “To the DAO and the Ethereum community,”
disagreed:

177 Christoph
Jentzsch, DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION TO
AUTOMATE GOVERNANCE 3, https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf (last
visited Feb. 2, 2018).
178 Id. at 2.
179 David Siegel, Understanding The DAO Attack, COINDESK (June 25, 2016), http://www.
coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-journalists/.
180 Christoph
Jentzsch, DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION TO
AUTOMATE GOVERNANCE 2, https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf (last
visited Feb. 2, 2018).
181 Phil Daian, Analysis of the DAO exploit, HACKING, DISTRIBUTED (June 18, 2016, 1:11 AM),
http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/06/18/analysis-of-the-dao-exploit/ (includes a detailed
technical explanation of the recursive bug with pictures of the code itself).
182 Rob Price, Digital currency Ethereum is cratering because of a $50 million hack,
BUSINESS INSIDER (June 17, 2016, 5:34 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/dao-hacked-et
hereum-crashing-in-value-tens-of-millions-allegedly-stolen-2016-6.
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I have carefully examined the code of The DAO and
decided to participate after finding the feature where
splitting is rewarded with additional ether. I have made
use of this feature and have rightfully claimed
3,641,694 ether, and would like to thank the DAO for
this reward. It is my understanding that the DAO code
contains this feature to promote decentralization and
encourage the creation of “child DAOs”.
I am disappointed by those who are characterizing the
use of this intentional feature as “theft.” I am making
use of this explicitly coded feature as per the smart
contract terms and my law firm has advised me that my
action is fully compliant with United States criminal
and tort law. For reference please review the terms of
the DAO. 183
The letter proceeded to quote from the DAO’s terms, which stated:
The terms of The DAO Creation are set forth in the
smart contract code existing on the Ethereum
blockchain at 0xbb9bc244d798123fde783fcc1c72d3bb8
c189413. Nothing in this explanation of terms or in any
other document or communication may modify or add
any additional obligations or guarantees beyond those
set forth in The DAO’s code. Any and all explanatory
terms or descriptions are merely offered for educational
purposes and do not supercede or modify the express
terms of The DAO’s code set forth on the blockchain; to
the extent you believe there to be any conflict or
discrepancy between the descriptions offered here and
the
functionality
of
The
DAO’s
code
at
0xbb9bc244d798123fde783fcc1c72d3bb8c189413, The

183 chris4210, An Open Letter To the DAO and the Ethereum community, STEEMIT, https://
steemit.com/ethereum/@chris4210/an-open-letter-to-the-dao-and-the-ethereum-community,
(last visited Jan. 28, 2018).
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DAO’s code controls and sets forth all terms of The DAO
Creation. 184
That ominous music is crescendoing now. The smart contract that
had created the DAO thus sowed the seeds of its undoing. The
founders had no contractual way to address the hack. Neither they,
nor anyone else, could reverse the transaction and restore the split
DAO funds to the main DAO account.
Yet one way out remained. Because each DAO transaction was
recorded in the Ethereum blockchain, if enough of the Ethereum
network agreed to it, the Ethereum team could release a new
version of the underlying blockchain—essentially altering the
ledger to reverse all of the DAO exploiter’s transactions. These
changes to the Ethereum protocol were referred to as the “hard fork”
solution because the change would split, or fork, the blockchain into
two separate and incompatible chains: the original blockchain on
which the split DAO occurred, and the revised chain that would
erase all of the 2016 DAO transactions. 185 This hard fork solution
restored the money siphoned off, but also undermined the central
premise and promise of the DAO—that the underlying code
constituted the unalterable “law” of the DAO, upon which all
participants could rely. 186
The 2016 DAO thus presented an existential crisis. Indeed, the
hard fork proposal created great controversy within the Ethereum
community, with a fundamental difference of opinion between hardfork supporters and blockchain purists. 187 Ultimately, the hard fork
was supported by a super majority (85-89%) of ether holders. 188 The
Bryant Joseph Gilot, Code != Law, MEDIUM (July 4, 2016), https://medium.com/@Cryp
toIQ.ca/code-law-58b6e39dd626.
185 Jeffrey Berns, Understanding Ethereum and the DAO Conundrum, BERNS WEISS LLP
(July 5, 2015, 5:28 PM) https://www.law111.com/understanding-ethereum-and-the-dao-conu
ndrum.
186 Paul Vigna, Ethereum Gets its Hard Fork and the ‘Truth’ Gets Tested, WSJ MONEYBEAT
(July 20, 2016) http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/07/20/ethereum-gets-its-hard-fork-andthe-truth-gets-tested/.
187 Note, many DAO investors and ether users discussed the proposal on the online message
boards.
188 Antonio Madeira, The DAO, The Hack, The Soft Fork and The Hard Fork,
CRYPTOCOMPARE (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-thehack-the-soft-fork-and-the-hard-fork/; David Yermack, Corporate Governance and
Blockchains, REVIEW OF FINANCE, (Dec. 5, 2017) at 23.
184
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Ethereum network erased the blockchain from the point of the token
diversion forward, wiping out its effects. 189 All original 2016 DAO
investors were refunded, but the hard fork effectively led to the
dissolution of the 2016 DAO. 190 Ethereum Classic exists as a kind
of alternate reality blockchain version of Ethereum, trading at a
significant discount but continuing nonetheless. 191
D. THE DAO’S UNEASY FIT IN EXISTING ORGANIZATION LAW

What does one make of the 2016 DAO story? The first challenge
is to locate the 2016 DAO within range of traditional business
entities. Historically, limited liability status has been available
only by filing an organizational document with a governmental
agency, and fulfilling appropriate statutory requirements. 192
Governing rules typically require specifying the entity’s organizers,
its initial capital structure, its registered agent for service of process
purposes, and the payment of the requisite filing fee. 193
The DAO organizers disclaimed any legal organizational
structure. 194 Yet these disclaimers are to no avail when it comes to
the application of partnership’s default rules. The 2016 DAO
participants entered into an association of two or more persons to
carry on as co-owners a business for profit. Foolish or naïve, they
tried to disclaim joint and several unlimited liability, but they could
not. They were at risk for the full total of the firm’s debt, and in
theory the firm could be liquidated by any one of the tokenholders’
189 Antonio Madeira, The DAO, The Hack, The Soft Fork and The Hard Fork,
CRYPTOCOMPARE (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-thehack-the-soft-fork-and-the-hard-fork/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2018).
190 Id. One legacy of the hard fork solution is that the old Ethereum blockchain continues
to exist as “Ethereum Classic.” On November 10, Ethereum Classic traded at $14.59, while
Ethereum traded at $315.57.
191 Antonio Madeira, What is Ethereum Classic, CRYPTOCOMPARE.COM (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/what-is-ethereum-classic/.
192 See, e.g., RULLCA 201(a); DLLCA § 18-201(a).
193 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
194 The legal status of DAOs remains the subject of active and vigorous debate and
discussion. Not everyone shares the same definition. Some have said that they are
autonomous code and can operate independently of legal systems; others have said that they
must be owned or operate by humans or human created entities. . . . Anyone who uses DAO
code will do so at their own risk. Christoph Jentzsch, DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS
ORGANIZATION
TO
AUTOMATE
GOVERNANCE
2,
https://download.
slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
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creditors. Cases are legion about how courts use a functional
approach to determine whether a partnership was formed. 195
Indeed, the sharing of profits is prima facie evidence of a
partnership, 196 and the 2016 DAO expressly contemplated that
tokenholders would participate in the profits of the business.
The 2016 DAO organizers and DAO enthusiasts often slipped
into corporate terminology when describing the potential of the
DAO. They rhapsodized about its ability to do away with the board
of directors, creating a new level of transparency and direct
involvement befitting a virtual corporation. 197 But because they
failed to take the requisite statutory steps, they did not create a
corporation. The irony was that instead they created that the ageold business organization, a partnership. 198
And that, with the major exception of the impact of U.S.
securities law (of which more later) is as far as the 2016 DAO goes
in terms of organizational law. Yet that’s not the end of the story.
While the 2016 DAO failed spectacularly, its existence raises the
prospect of a radically new phenomenon. The DAO of the future
could be an entity that, via a combination of contract and the
peculiar characteristics of the blockchain, exhibits the features
formerly only available to corporations: limited liability and asset
partitioning, including liquidation protection.
This newfound power is the result the blockchain’s nature as a
public ledger. As we have seen, in traditional business associations,
only the corporate form can reliably separate firm assets from the
195 Glenn G. Morris, Agency, Partnerships & Corporations, 51 LA. L. REV. 217, 219-22
(1990).
196 RUPA § 202(c)(3).
197 Vitalik Buterin, DAOs, DACs, DAs and More: An Incomplete Terminology Guide,
ETHEREUM BLOG (May 6, 2014), https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacs-das-andmore-an-incomplete-terminology-guide/ (“[O]ne can take [a] shareholder-owned corporation
above, and transplant it entirely on the blockchain; a long-running blockchain-based contract
maintains a record of each individual’s holdings of their shares, and on-blockchain voting
would allow the shareholders to select the positions of the board of directors and the
employees.”).
198 In If Rockefeller Were a Coder, Carla Reyes suggests that DAOs could evade the reach of
the partnership penalty default by organizing as business trusts. The DAO would “hold the
trust property in the form of digital assets,” and there would be trustee tokenholders as well
as certificate tokenholders. “Only a trustee token, and not a certificate token, would be
endowed with the right to transfer or otherwise dispose of the DAO’s property.” Carla Reyes,
If Rockefeller Were a Coder (Dec. 5, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082915 at 42-43.
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creditors and partner assets from the creditors of the firm. The
partnership form automatically fills in as the default form if the
parties do not affirmatively organize as a limited liability entity.
The risk that poses is ultimately the risks that someone not bound
by intrafirm contracts—a creditor, either of the partnership or the
individual partners—will make an unanticipated and unavoidable
claim on assets that the parties desire to shield.
The transparency of the blockchain, coupled with its
imperviousness to defaults, creates such a shield.
Blockchain
participants know exactly what contracts and claims they are
subject to in a way that their corporeal firm counterparts cannot.
We return to the various features of corporate law that have, so far,
been understood to be unique to the corporate form to see how the
blockchain can approximate them.
III. THE PROMISE OF THE BLOCKCHAIN
With the corporate exceptionalism theories of Part I in mind, we
can begin to appreciate the potential the DAO offers of upending the
spectrum of business entities. Perhaps it would help to start with
how lawsuits look in the real world. Susan operates a small nail care
business with Jim, Susan’s Salon. She’s gotten in over her head, and
the salon owes suppliers more than it can pay. The business folds,
and it turns out that Susan never filed with the state where she
operates as a corporation, LLC, or other limited liability entity. As
a result, Susan is personally liable for the debts of the business
creditors. 199 They take her to court, prove that she is liable, and
obtain a judgment against her. She is forced to sell her house and
car to pay the judgment.
Now let’s suppose Susan instead set up a different business on
the blockchain, Susan’s Blockchain Storage (SBS), that will create
a decentralized marketplace for storing files, using the blockchain
to encrypt them. 200 Any business faces two types of potential
See supra note 53.
Filecoin launched an ICO in August 2017 on this model, raising $257 million. Stan
Higgins, $257 Million: Filecoin Breaks All-Time Record for ICO Funding, COINDESK (Sept. 7,
2017), https://www.coindesk.com/257-million-filecoin-breaks-time-record-ico-funding/; Bennett
Garner, What is Filecoin? Beginner’s Guide to the Largest-Ever ICO, COINCENTRAL (Feb. 20,
2018), https://coincentral.com/filecoin-beginners-guide-largest-ever-ico/.
199
200
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creditors, voluntary and involuntary (that is, tort) creditors. 201 As
to the former, the code of the blockchain would have to specify the
terms and conditions of loans in order for an obligation to arise.
The 2016 DAO had no creditors. Although its coders described it
in terms of a corporation, it was more of a virtual venture capital
fund—it had no operating costs, and thus no need of creditors. But
future DAOs could offer a security interest to creditors that could
be baked directly into the smart contract. One could imagine a
creditor lending to a future DAO, on the condition of a smart
contract that provides the terms for repayment with interest. The
DAO could in the initial code—or after, presumably, with a
subsequent vote—create debt versions of tokens that automatically
entitle creditors to assets under certain circumstances: including
before a split, before a liquidation, or upon certain dates or under
certain conditions, as when token activity reaches a specified level.
The attraction from the creditors’ perspective is considerable.
Monitoring a borrower’s activities constitutes a major transaction
cost of any loan arrangement (for this reason, banks and other
lenders protect themselves with covenants, inspection rights, and
other mechanisms to ensure that the creditor can be assured of
repayment). 202 But monitoring would be far less costly if the
creditor could code enforcement mechanisms directly into the
contract. On the blockchain, creditors would have to do very little
in monitoring asset levels and prior claims, because the contract
encoded in the DAO would protect their interest. In this sense,
creditors could lend money without the risk of opportunism, and the
high cost of monitoring, as long as the code itself established, for
example, trigger points for return of principal. For example, the
code could specify that if the DAO’s assets dip below a certain
amount, the debt is automatically called and the loan repaid.
Interest rates could reset automatically, and creditors could waive
protective covenants by means of voting on the blockchain.
A key point is this: in order to mimic their real-world
counterparts in obtaining a right to individual tokenholders’
personal assets—a right that is automatically theirs in traditional
Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 193 (2004).
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1425 (1989).
201
202
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partnerships 203—creditors would have to establish that right within
the blockchain code. Otherwise, although DAO creditors would
have the theoretical right to reach those personal assets, in practice
the blockchain would not permit them to do so. On the other hand,
tort creditors are involuntary creditors who cannot anticipate being
the victims of a particular tortfeasor. 204 These creditors would have
no ability to contract for recourse to tokenholder, and the default
code would, as with voluntary creditors, not permit access to
individual accounts. A DAO creditor would have to reduce a claim
to judgment, track down individual tokenholders, and convince
judges to enforce a claim.
In summary, say a loan of one of the creditors of SBS, our
hypothetical business, is not repaid because of a fault in the code.
The creditor convinces a New York court that it has jurisdiction. It
obtains a judgment against SBS for $100,000. It cannot enforce a
judgment against SBS unless the blockchain has a way to recognize
valid court orders and effectuate them. In other words, it would
need a legal intervention point coded into the blockchain that
recognized the legitimacy of the judgment, and provided a means to
effectuate it. What of SBS’s tokenholders? What of the unlimited
joint and several personal liability that makes real-world
partnership such a dangerous form? The answer to that question,
and the potential for a legal intervention point in the intersection
between the blockchain and the tokenholder’s corporeal-world
identity, takes us that central corporate feature, limited liability.
A. LIMITED LIABILITY

SBS’s creditor would need to identify the true identity of Susan,
or at least one of SBS’s tokenholders in order to get at that
tokenholder’s personal assets. Then the creditor would have to
prove that the tokenholder in question held the tokens at the time
of the default. In a sense, the blockchain makes this proof easy by
laying bare the history of all of SBS’s transactions. Even with this
proof, however, SBS’s creditor faces two obstacles to satisfying a
judgment: the code will almost certainly not automatically provide
203
204

RUPA § 306.
Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 193 (2004).
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access to tokenholder accounts. And the pseudonymous nature of
the blockchain creates a practical obstacle to pursuing individual
tokenholders’ real-world assets.
First, while in theory one could imagine tokenholders agreeing
to some level of individual recourse (for example, that the DAO
creditor could reach into a tokenholder’s personal wallet for up to 50
ether), in practice it is hard to imagine a tokenholder affirmatively
opting into the partnership’s default of unlimited liability by
permitting a DAO creditor unlimited access to a personal wallet.
Yet that’s exactly what would have to occur in order to mirror realworld unlimited liability. An entity-level escrow account would be
the more natural mechanism for providing such protection. More
likely would be for the DAOs of the future to encode protections
contractually limiting DAO creditors to claims upon the DAO and
the DAO alone—thus contracting for limited liability, again in the
absence of the corporate code.
Second, the law presupposes that the partnership’s creditors will
be able to ascertain the partners’ identities, and then pursue them
to satisfy the firm’s debts. While a partnership creditor in the real
world can expect headaches and holdups in identifying the
appropriate jurisdiction, reducing a claim to judgment and then
locating and attaching partner assets, 205 at least the creditor knows
what defendants to go after.
The virtual world of the blockchain is a different story.
Ethereum and other DTLs are not anonymous, but, rather, pseudoanonymous, or pseudonymous: 206 the blockchain preserves all
transactions in the network, allowing anyone to inspect and analyze
them. 207 All transactions linked to a particular address are visible
on the blockchain, which is public and transparent. 208 However, it

205 Brent A. Olson, Actions by and against partnership and partners—Actions in general,
BUSINESS LAW DESKBOOK § 4:27 (2017).
206 Aaron
van Wirdum, Is Bitcoin Anonymous? A Complete Beginner’s Guide,
BITCOINMAGAZINE (Nov. 18, 2015, 2:34 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/is-bitc
oin-anonymous-a-complete-beginner-s-guide-1447875283/.
207 Ameer Abbas, Understanding Privacy: How Anonymous Can Bitcoin Payments Be?,
BITCOINIST.NET (Oct. 14, 2016, 4:48 PM), https://bitcoinist.com/understanding-privacyanonymous-bitcoin/.
208 Id.
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is not possible to link a particular wallet address to the real-world
identity of a person/company without additional information. 209
Security experts described this as “pseudonymous privacy,”
comparing it to “writing books under a nom de plume.” 210 An
anonymous author can produce dozens of books under a pseudonym.
J.K. Rowling penned the Cuckoo’s Calling under the nom de plume
Robert Galbraith—just as Stephen King wrote under the name
Richard Bachman. 211 In each case, the pseudonym cloaked the
author’s true identity effectively for a time.
But once the
pseudonym was linked to its real-life counterpart, the author’s
entire pseudonymic writing history became compromised.
Similarly, as soon as individuals’ personal details are linked to their
bitcoin (to use the most widespread cryptocurrency) address, their
entire transaction history—including any available assets—are laid
bare as well. 212
As former federal prosecutor Jason Weinstein explains:
A user’s bitcoin address is just an account number that
stays with the user; if you can connect that address to a
particular user, you can identify and trace all of the
transactions in which that individual has participated
using that address. Indeed, if the individual uses an
exchange or wallet service as the “on ramp” to the
blockchain, then the bitcoin address is essentially about
as anonymous as a bank account number, because the
exchange or wallet service will maintain records linking
the address to a particular identity, much like a bank

209 Jacob J, IRS Uses Chainalysis to Track Down Bitcoin Tax Cheats, COINTELEGRAPH
(Aug. 23, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/irs-uses-chainalysis-to-track-down-bitcointax-cheats.
210 Robert, Bitcoin Transactions Aren’t as Anonymous as Everyone Hoped, TECHNOLOGY
BREAKING NEWS (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.technologybreakingnews.com/2017/08/bitcointransactions-arent-as-anonymous-as-everyone-hoped/.
211 Haroon Siddique, JK Rowling publishes crime novel under false name, THE GUARDIAN
(July 14, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/jul/14/jk-rowling-crime-novel-cuck
oos-calling.
212 Emerging Technology from the arXiv, Bitcoin Transactions Aren’t as Anonymous as
Everyone Hoped, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.
com/s/608716/bitcoin-transactions-arent-as-anonymous-as-everyone-hoped/.
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maintains records establishing the owner of each bank
account. 213
Note that the pseudonymity of cryptocurrency does not perfectly
protect against identification. There are three main ways in which
to de-anonymize bitcoin users (and the same principles apply to
Ethereum): 214
1)

2)

Because bitcoin is a peer-to-peer network
(vulnerable to hackers), if hackers can connect to
the bitcoin network using several nodes or
computers, there is a high chance that they can
extract enough information to decipher where
transactions originated. 215
Bitcoin addresses can be linked to real identities if
these real identities are used in combination with
the bitcoin addresses in some way. This includes
addresses used to deposit or withdraw money to or
from a (regulated) exchange or wallet service,
publicly exposed donation addresses, or addresses
simply used to send bitcoin to someone (including
the online store) when using a real identity.
Cryptocurrency exchanges are subject to knowyour-customer and anti-money laundering rules, so
individuals making use of these exchanges—as will
most unsophisticated users—can be relatively
easily identified by law enforcement. 216

213 Jason Weinstein, How can law enforcement leverage the blockchain in investigations?,
COIN CENTER (May 12, 2015), https://coincenter.org/entry/how-can-law-enforcement-leverag
e-the-blockchain-in-investigations.
214 Ameer Abbas, Understanding Privacy: How Anonymous Can Bitcoin Payments Be?,
BITCOINIST.NET (Oct. 14, 2016, 4:48 PM), https://bitcoinist.com/understanding-privacyanonymous-bitcoin/; Aaron van Wirdum, Is Bitcoin Anonymous? A Complete Beginner’s
Guide, BITCOINMAGAZINE (Nov. 18, 2015, 2:34 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articl
es/is-bitcoin-anonymous-a-complete-beginner-s-guide-1447875283/.
215 Ameer Abbas, Understanding Privacy: How Anonymous Can Bitcoin Payments Be?,
BITCOINIST.NET (Oct. 14, 2016, 4:48 PM), https://bitcoinist.com/understanding-privacyanonymous-bitcoin/.
216 Robinson Randolph, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of Initial Coin
Offerings 24 (Sept. 1, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3087 541.
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Perhaps most importantly, all transactions over
the bitcoin network are completely transparent and
traceable by anyone. It is typically this complete
transparency that allows multiple bitcoin addresses
to be clustered together, and be tied to the same
user. Therefore, if just one of these clustered
addresses is linked to a real-world identity through
one or several of the other de-anonymizing
methods, all clustered addresses can be revealed. 217

Nevertheless, as one commentator has observed, sophisticated
users who are willing to go to “extraordinary lengths” can find ways
to acquire and use bitcoin anonymously. Even so, “the open nature
of the transaction ledger and other unknowns leave open the
possibility that identities and activities once considered perfectly
secure may be revealed at some point down the road.” 218
217 Ameer Abbas, Understanding Privacy: How Anonymous Can Bitcoin Payments Be?,
BITCOINIST.NET (Oct. 14, 2016, 4:48 PM), https://bitcoinist.com/understanding-privacy-an
onymous-bitcoin/.
218 Adam Ludwin, How Anonymous is Bitcoin?, COIN CENTER (Jan. 20, 2015), https://
coincenter.org/entry/how-anonymous-is-bitcoin. The most common method to improve a
user’s level of financial privacy protection is to use a “tumbler” (also called a “mixer”).
Tumblers work by literally mixing up a user’s payment with lots of other payments from other
users. Put another way, tumblers take a set of bitcoins and return another set of the same
value (minus a processing fee) with different addresses and transaction histories, thus
effectively “laundering” the coins. This makes it very difficult for any observer to be able to
work out who is actually sending money to whom. An observer who knows your addresses
will still be able to see that you have sent or received a certain amount of money. But if an
individual uses a tumbler, in theory, the observer will not be able to tell to whom the user
has made a payment. Dean, How to use a Bitcoin mixer or tumbler, CRYPTORIALS (Feb. 17,
2017), http://cryptorials.io/use-bitcoin-mixer-tumbler/; Adam Ludwin, How Anonymous is
Bitcoin?, COIN CENTER (Jan. 20, 2015), https://coincenter.org/entry/how-anonymous-is-bit
coin. Tumbling services pose serious risks. Users must hand over control of their bitcoins
and trust the service to return them. Transaction graph analysis can identify use of a mixing
service and flag the user as potentially suspicious. Moreover, mixers do not work well for very
large sums, unless others with similarly large sums happen to be mixing their bitcoins at the
same time. Some mixing services do not work as advertised and can be reverse-engineered.
Services that operate legally must keep detailed records of how the coins were mixed, which
could later be hacked or subpoenaed. And the new bitcoins received might themselves be
tainted by illegal activity. Adam Ludwin, How Anonymous is Bitcoin?, COIN CENTER (Jan.
20, 2015), https://coincenter.org/entry/how-anonymous-is-bitco in. Steven Goldfeder, a fourth
year PhD student in the Department of Computer Science at Princeton University, has
observed that if an individual uses CoinJoin, a popular mixer, to make several purchases, it
is straightforward to link them back: “If the victim employs 3 rounds of CoinJoin and the
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In conclusion, DAO tokenholders enjoy two main bulwarks
against personal liability for firm liabilities. First, the blockchain
itself can limit contract creditors to the assets of the firm. Though
this is a smart contract, presumably a court would recognize its
validity in the real world, since the creditor has affirmatively agreed
not to have recourse to individual tokenholders assets. Second, for
tort creditors 219 or non-tort without contractual protections in place,
pseudonymity provides a weaker shield against firm liabilities. A
creditor faced with the prospect of finding the right jurisdiction,
reducing a claim to judgment, and then identifying and tracking
down tokenholders may well conclude the effort is not worth her
time.
B. ASSET PARTITIONING VIA CONTRACT ALONE

Remember, the reverse of limited liability is entity shielding. 220
Here the concern is the threat that the debts of the partners pose to
the entity itself. Say Susan owns tokens of a DAO. Further say that
her creditors are able to reduce their claims against her to
judgment. Susan, like presumably most debtors, would likely try
not to disclose that she had a blockchain asset. Her creditors or the
bankruptcy court would first have to know of the existence of her
wallet, with the tokens, ether, or bitcoins contained therein. But
what if creditors determine that she owns DAO tokens? They could
go to court (presuming they can find a court with jurisdiction) to
require her to divulge her key. They would have to prove their claim
on any tokens or assets in the wallet—presumably they could do so
with ease. Then they could force her to transfer any tokens in the
wallet. But they could not use those tokens to force liquidation of
the actual business—or, following the more modern rule, a buyout
of whatever the tokens are worth.
adversary observes two of the victim’s payments, he can link them back to her wallet (despite
mixing) with 98% accuracy.” Emerging Technology from the arXiv, Bitcoin Transactions
Aren’t as Anonymous as Everyone Hoped, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Aug. 23, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608716/bitcoin-transactions-ar ent-as-anonymous-aseveryone-hoped/.
219 It is hard to imagine what a DAO tort creditor would even look like. As Part IV.B. details,
governmental fines may be more likely claims.
220 See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
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This inability stems from the fact that the blockchain is a
decentralized and distributed technology. There is no one person
that controls the code. Even if a court rendered judgment in favor
of a particular creditor, if the code did not permit a liquidation, then
any attempt by a creditor or a coder in the creditor’s employ to
update the blockchain to liquidate the entity would be rejected by
the consensus of miners. Such a change would therefore not become
part of the distributed ledger. Thus, even after finding a court with
jurisdiction, attempts to enforce a judgment against an organization
would founder if that organization’s basic code does not recognize
such a judgment.
Again, the lack of a legal intervention point protects against the
traditional partnership vulnerability to partner creditors. Thus,
while the DAO in theory may be a partnership, that most vulnerable
of business forms, legal recourse in practice will prove well-nigh
impossible.
To summarize, the DAO is legally a partnership, so that personal
creditors could in theory liquidate it. But the tokens do not give her
that power. Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire assert that only
organizational law can perform the entity shielding function of
providing protection from the creditors of individual investors, but
in the virtual world contract can play the role. 221 Because the smart
contract does not permit liquidation, effectively it provides entity
shielding.
More broadly than mere entity shielding, the blockchain provides
a radical form of asset partitioning. Because of the ability to code
smart contracts directly into the blockchain, assets can be reliably
apportioned to specific uses without the need for a separate entity
structure, obviating the need for a separate organization Triantis
identifies. Similarly, addressing Blair’s concern about capital lockin, a DAO’s blockchain could provide that no single tokenholder
could liquidate the blockchain. Indeed, as a practical matter, it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce any theoretical
liquidation right if it is not already encoded in the block chain.
This point is worth restating. In theory, the tokenholders’
creditors would have the right to liquidate the DAO. But in practice,
See generally Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise
of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335 (2006).
221
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the DAO would have to code that right in to provide a legal
intervention point on which the penalty default rules of partnership
a place to take effect. The law gives creditors that power in the real
world. But it cannot in the DAO.
IV. LEGAL INTERVENTION POINTS
So far, I have treated the blockchain as being unto itself, a nexus
of contracts made flesh. The first section of this part will continue
in that vein. But the idea of a fully autonomous business
organization untethered to the corporeal world is, and may always
be, largely fanciful. In the second section, however, the lens will
widen to explore the question of legal intervention points for
blockchain entities not organized wholly on the blockchain. Here
the law can and will intervene.
A. THE PURE BLOCKCHAIN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION

Can business entities exist on the blockchain alone? If so, then
no legal intervention point will exist unless explicitly coded. Section
1 argues that such entities can in fact exist, and Section 2 sketches
out some possible governance models for such organizations.
1. The Possibility of a Purely Blockchain Entity. The easiest way
for blockchain entities to evade the reach of the law would be to
organize entirely on the blockchain, without the organizers
identifying themselves in any way as associated with the blockchain
entity. The idea of strangers organizing via pseudonyms and trying
to coordinate a governance structure is not as unthinkable as one
might suppose. The true identity of bitcoin’s designer or designers
is unknown—“Satoshi Nakamoto” is the pseudonym he, she, or they
used. 222 Bitcoin was born out a distrust for authority and driven by
a desire for governance by community consensus rather than
central authority. 223 Nakamoto seems not to have been a promoter
looking to make a quick buck, but rather an idealist looking to break
222 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (2008), https://
bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
223 Ryan Clements, Decoding The Demand For Cryptocurrency: What Is Driving The Historic
Price Surge?, The FinReg Blog (Sept. 25, 2017), https://sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/
2017/09/26/decoding-the-demand-for-cryptocurrency-what-is-driving-the-historic-price-surge/.
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governments’ monopoly on currency by offering an alternative to
fiat currency. 224 Bitcoin suggests that it might be possible, even
likely, given the open source ethos of the blockchain, for a business
organization to exist that encoded real governance into its code,
enabling pseudonymous participants to engage in real decisionmaking for the firm without identifiable organizers claiming credit
for doing so.
One white paper describes a DAO as “a self-organizing entity”
that “better resembles an organism rather than an organization.” 225
In fact, a fully autonomous, self-reproducing DAO now exists: the
Plantoid, “a robot or synthetic organism designed to look, act and
grow like a plant.” 226 As Carla Reyes describes it:
If an onlooker passing by the Plantoid sufficiently
appreciates the Plantoid's artistic qualities, the
onlooker may send a donation to the Plantoid through
the decentralized virtual currency called bitcoin. The
onlooker sends the bitcoin directly to a wallet owned by
the Plantoid itself. As an expression of gratitude for the
funds transfer, the Plantoid performs a dance for the
onlooker. Once the Plantoid raises sufficient funds, the
Plantoid advertises for, selects, and commissions an
artist to create a new Plantoid. 227
If the DAO is an organism, creating its own nexus of contracts as it
goes, there may be little room in its operation for formal law at all.
It can make its own rules (as we will see, quite sophisticated rules),
and even replicate, all autonomously, without an identifiable
individual doing the organizing. And without an individual on the
scene, there is no actor for the law to latch onto. The code really is
the law—the only law. There is no legal intervention point on which
the law can work.
224 Joseph Young, It’s Not Really About Bitcoin Price Surging, It’s Fiat Currencies In Free
Fall, COINTELEGRAPH (Dec. 4, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/its-not-really-about-bit
coin-price-surging-its-fiat-currencies-in-free-fall.
225 DAO Stack, White Paper V1.0, 6 (Oct. 29, 2017), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CqNhyP1IaZMWkPUf61HYZ5zo1FnDYAp/view.
226 I’m a PLANTOID, http://okhaos.com/plantoids/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
227 Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384, 385–86 (2017).
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To be clear, this point is not a normative one. I am not a cyberseparatist, arguing that regulation should not apply to the
blockchain. 228 I am merely pointing out that, for the first time as a
practical matter, the possibility exists of a type of business
organization that can exist apart from the defaults of contract law.
It may be that this possibility will remain an obscure footnote in the
history of the blockchain, and that examples such as the Plantoid or
bitcoin are aberrations. It may be that people who create entities
generally do so to make a profit, and ultimately cannot do so solely
on the blockchain. If international regulation makes it impossible
to exchange bitcoin for fiat currency, and the bitcoin economy
remains as limited as it is now, even Satoshi Nakamoto (or the
Satoshi Nakamotos of the future) may not see much profit in pure
blockchain entities. The intersection between blockchain and the
corporeal world will then provide a legal intervention point, as Part
IV will describe.
For now, it remains to be seen whether pure blockchain entities
are viable. Accept for the moment that such entities will exist in
the future. Any discussion of the purely blockchain entity must deal
with the problem the 2016 DAO posed—the problem that represents
the flipside of the freedom from default rules that the 2016 DAO
cast in stark relief. As Easterbrook and Fischel have observed, even
when parties think they have planned for every eventuality, “they
are apt to miss something” because “[a]ll sorts of complexities will
arise later.” 229 The central argument of The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law 230 is that corporate law supplies majoritarian
default rules that fill the gaps of parties’ necessarily incomplete
contracts. Yet, as we have seen, when gaps arise in the blockchain’s
smart contracts, there are no legal intervention points upon which
the law can work. The blockchain needs intervention points in order
to fill the gaps in incomplete contracts. Said differently, blockchain
entities have a governance problem.

228 Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, The Shape of Governance: Analyzing the World of Internet
Regulation, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 605, 618 (2003).
229 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1444 (1989).
230 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
(1996).
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2. The Problem of Blockchain Governance. The failure of the
2016 DAO made clear the problem of governance on the blockchain.
There is no code that could anticipate all problems that will arise.
The problem with the 2016 DAO was that it didn’t provide a
mechanism for the tokenholders to vote to change the code to
address the flaw once it arose. This section will describe three
different governance models that emerged in the post-2016-DAO
era to address the governance failures of the DAO. Notably, each of
these mechanisms creates an intervention point—a place in the
code where participants can supply terms to the incomplete contract
in light of events following the initial launch of the code-contract.
None of them supply a legal intervention point—that is, a point
where a legal authority can assert jurisdiction. But they do supply
intervention points, nonetheless.
First, DAOStack illustrates a dizzying array of governance
options unimaginable in a traditional corporation. For example,
imagine a corporation that weighs some shares more than others
using a reputation system, rather than operating on a vote-pershare basis. DAOStack enables a DAO to institute such a system,
whereby tokenholders can earn reputation—for example, for past
contributions or successful proposals to the DAO. 231 Reputation,
unlike tokens, is not transferrable, but instead awarded to or earned
by “specific members, according to their merits and contributions
made to the organizations.” 232 To guard against locking up decisionmaking power with a group that could become less engaged down
the road, an organization can provide that reputation will dissipate
over time. 233
A common concern in public corporations is voter apathy, and the
corporation generally offers the blunt tool of quorum to ensure that
low voter turnout does not allow a minority preference to govern. 234
With DAOStack, voting schemes can be weighted by reputation. 235
DAO Stack, White Paper V1.0, 2 (Oct. 29, 2017), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CqNhyP1IaZMWkPUf61HYZ5zo1FnDYAp/view.
232 Id. at 6.
233 Id. at 15.
234 Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 175
n.17 (2009).
235 DAO Stack, White Paper V1.0, 21 (Oct. 29, 2017), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CqN
hy-P1IaZMWkPUf61HYZ5zo1FnDYAp/view.
231
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There can be a finite number of proposals open to vote at any one
time—with all other proposals in a queue. 236 Tokenholders need not
rely on an individual or individuals to serve as gatekeepers or
agenda-setters. 237 If there is a queue, a tokenholder can “boost” a
proposal by putting tokens at stake that will be returned if the
proposal is successful. 238
Moreover, just as bitcoin has issuance limits, the DAOStack
organization can build in certain constraints. Examples offered
include a cap of the total number of tokens that can be issued, a rate
of token inflation, a limit on the use of funds, a maximum amount
of reputation that can be issued in a given time period, and more. 239
For lawyers, these strictures might seem akin to charter-based
limits on the authorized number of shares. As a practical, matter,
however, they provide protection against future dilution even more
robust than those found in the corporeal corporation: they are selfenforcing structural constraints. Finally, DAOStack provides what
the 2016 DAO failed to offer: a mechanism for amending its
governance structure. Called “governance upgrades,” these allow
the organization to specify the mechanism for changing their
governance models. 240 As the DAOStack white paper remarks, “the
spectrum of possibility [a] scheme’s design [allows] is nearly
endless.” 241
Another blockchain operator, Aragon offers would-be
entrepreneurs the ability to organize on the blockchain, issue
tokens, and raise funds. 242 But Aragon goes further in creating
Id.
Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and
Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 741-43 (2005).
238 To avoid “finalization attacks,” where voting in the final period changes the outcome, the
DAO can provide that “if on the last day of opening the majority changed from yes to no (or vice
versa), the voting period would extend for another day. The vote is closed only when the result
does not change on the last day of voting.” DAO Stack, White Paper V1.0, 21 (Oct. 29, 2017),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CqNhy-P1IaZMWkPUf61HYZ5zo1FnDYAp/view.
239 DAO Stack, White Paper V1.0 (Oct. 29, 2017), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CqNhy-P
1IaZMWkPUf61HYZ5zo1FnDYAp/view.
240 Id. at 16.
241 Id. at 17.
242 Its white paper promises to implement “basic features of an organization like a cap table,
token transfers, voting, role assignments, fundraising, and accounting. The behavior of an
Aragon organization is easily customized by changing the bylaws.” Luis Cuende & Jorge
Izquierdo, A DECENTRALIZED INFRASTRUCTURE FOR VALUE EXCHANGE, ARAGON
236
237
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private law on the blockchain. As the whitepaper observes, “The
traditional solutions to [opportunistic behavior] are governmentpowered jurisdictions. Since Aragon organizations are location and
government-agnostic—they are meant to be run on the Ethereum
network—we came out with a better solution.” 243 The Aragon
Network provides “basic constitution and governance methods.” 244
Within the Network, organizations can create new laws specific to
their organization. 245
Aragon also provides an “unbiased arbitration system…for cases
where conflict is not explicitly resolved in the smart contract
code.” 246 The nuances are beyond the scope of this Article, but some
details make clear the level of thought behind the effort.
Arbitration requires an applicant posting a bond of tokens, or
putting a freeze on an organization’s contracts if the applicant has
an ownership interest in the organization. 247 A panel of judges
render a verdict via a “two-step reveal” to prevent collusion on the
part of the judges. 248 They must reveal their verdict in order to
learn their fellow panelists’ decision. If the applicant is successful,
her bond is returned; if unsuccessful, the judges keep it. If
applicants are dissatisfied, they can appeal (or “request an
upgrade,” in Aragon parlance) by posting a “significantly larger”
bond and having all of the available judges participate. 249 All judges
who “voted the incorrect answer are extremely penalized.” 250
NETWORK (Apr. 20, 2017), https://wiki.aragon.one/documentation/whitepaper/ #11-aboutaragon-core, 1, 1.1. Like DAOStack, Aragon enables organizations to account for reputation,
and it allows tokens to be issued with limited transferability according to a vesting calendar.
Id. It promises organizations a way off the “VC unicorn rollercoaster” of fundraising, where
they can “easily issue new shares in exchange for capital without operating with a third party,
both through direct sales and public offerings.” Id. What’s more, Aragon offers a simpler way
to hire and pay employees by allowing organizations to issue tokens under specific time- or
task-based parameters. Id.
243 Id. at Appendix A, 1.
244 Id. at 5.4. Network Adaptability.
245 Id. (“Effectively, organizations will be able to use the Aragon Network’s services basic
constitution and services as a framework, and build a custom set of rules to govern
relationships inside organizations.”).
246 Id. at Appendix A, 3.
247 Id. at Appendix A, 2.3.
248 Id. at Appendix A, 3.2.
249 Id. at Appendix A, 3.3.
250 Id.
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Finally, a supreme court is composed of the top nine judges, as
measured by which judges have sided with the majority the most in
the past. 251
It has not likely been lost on the reader that each of these
examples is, in one manner or another, recreating governance
mechanisms familiar in the corporeal world—even to the extent of
Aragon mimicking the number of the justices on the U.S. Supreme
Court.
Tezos stands as a cautionary tale regarding blockchain
governance. Hard on the heels of the 2016 DAO’s hard fork, the first
problem Tezos aimed to solve was the “hard fork” problem, or the
inability for Bitcoin to dynamically innovate due to coordination
issues. 252 A Tezos tokenholder could propose an alteration to the
community of token holders. 253 If a quorum was reached, and a
majority voted for the proposal, the alteration would be
implemented to the blockchain. 254 This structure provided a fluid
system of governance over time and was intended to eliminate the
need for a 2016-DAO-style hard fork. 255 Tezos’s ICO in July of 2017
garnered $232 million in bitcoin and Ether, which rose to be worth
almost $1 billion at the end of the year as the cryptocurrency it
raised increased in value. 256 Ironically, however, Tezos’ ICO has
been mired in a governance dispute amongst its founders and is on
indefinite hold. 257
Id.
L.M Goodman, Tezos: A Self-Amending Crypto-Ledger Position Paper (Aug. 3, 2014),
https://www.tezos.com/static/papers/position_paper.pdf.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Additionally, to guarantee the smart contract alterations and additions did not contain
avoidable bugs, Tezos’s smart contract language used “formal verification,” which essentially
allowed developers to mathematically prove the correctness of their code. Omri Barzilay, Tezos’
$232 Million ICO May Just Be The Beginning, Forbes (July 15, 2017, 8:39 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/omribarzilay/2017/07/15/tezos-232-million-ico-may-just-be-the-beginnin
g/#555b4e414c52; Linda Xie, A beginner’s guide to Tezos, MEDIUM (Aug. 3, 2017), https://
medium.com/@linda.xie/a-beginners-guide-to-tezos-c9618240183f; Governance, TEZOS.COM,
https://www.tezos.com/governance (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).
256 Omri Barzilay, Tezos’ $232 Million ICO May Just Be The Beginning, FORBES (July 15,
2017, 8:39 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/omribarzilay/2017/07/15/tezos-232-million-icomay-just-be-the-beginning/#4407ebde4c52.
257 See Joon Ian Wong, A cryptocurrency raised $400 million to avoid bitcoin’s “civil war”
and now has its own, QUARTZ (Oct. 19, 2017), https://qz.com/1106594/tezos-dispute-puts400-million-raised-in-the-ico-at-risk/. Three class-action lawsuits have been filed against
251
252
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Voltaire once declared that “If god did not exist, it would be
necessary to invent him.” 258 In similar fashion, it may well be that,
if business associations law does not exist on the blockchain, the
blockchain will have to create it. DAOs, like all organizations and
all organisms, require some kind of governance mechanism when
inevitable gaps arise in the incomplete contract of the firm. As the
emergence of Aragon illustrates, newfangled organizations have an
appetite to address these governance issues. They seem willing to
borrow from traditional models, but also ready to adapt them to the
challenges of the pseudonymous world of the blockchain. This
Section has provided examples of the many governance options
available on the blockchain. While many of these options will be
obsolete by the time this Article goes to print, the larger point will
not: the DAO opens up a dizzying array of governance possibilities
as long as intervention points exist in the code, where governance
can be exercised. As long as these organizations exist solely on the
blockchain, their interaction with traditional business law—as well
as securities law and other forms of state regulation—could be
minimal.
The contours of governance on the blockchain—and the extent to
which jurisdictions will recognize it, or even have the chance to
recognize it—remain open questions. Another open question is how
securities law, and other law, will interact with the blockchain.
Most entities organized on the blockchain thus far have had
identifiable human organizers who remain susceptible to the reach
of laws, even if the blockchain itself resists it. This is a key point:
as long as there are identifiable organizers in the corporeal world—
as long as an entity does not exist solely on the blockchain—they
will provide a legal intervention point. The next Section begins with
U.S. securities law, as it is the law that has been the most
influential in shaping the contours of ICOs. But the two key
Tezos founders Arthur and Kathleen Breitman. They are mired in a dispute with Johann
Gevers, President of the Tezos Foundation, that controls the ICO proceeds. The Tezos project
is on indefinite hold. Steve Stecklow, Anna Irrera, & Brenna Hughes Neghaiwi, Exclusive:
Tezos founders push for legal bailout from Swiss foundation, REUTERS (Dec. 1, 2017, 6:06
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitcoin-tezos-lawsuits-exclusive/exclusi ve-tezosfounders-push-for-legal-bailout-from-swiss-foundation-idUSKBN1DV4K0.
258 If God Did Not Exist, It Would Be Necessary to Invent Him, VOLTAIRE SOC’Y AM.,
http://www.whitman.edu/VSA/trois.imposteurs.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2017).
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questions are broader ones: Where are the legal intervention points
in the blockchain? And how should the law work upon them?
B. CORPOREAL ENTITIES WITH ASSOCIATED BLOCKCHAIN
ORGANIZATIONS

So far most ICOs and DAOs have not organized purely on the
blockchain. Instead they have opted for some identifiable group of
promoters. This move puts them squarely subject to regulation by
governing authorities. The ways in which the U.S. and other
jurisdictions will regulate the blockchain are still open questions.
Coin exchanges, for example, are subject to anti-money laundering
and Know Your Customer regulations. 259 South Korea recently put
in place measures to curb cryptocurrency speculation by requiring
trading only through real-name bank accounts linked to
cryptocurrency exchanges. 260
Staying within the scope of business associations law, once the
identity of a blockchain owner is known, a court could establish
jurisdiction over the blockchain business association as a
partnership by establishing personal jurisdiction over the known
individual. Personal jurisdiction over a single partner is enough to
establish personal jurisdiction over the partnership and, in some
jurisdictions, over the remaining partners. 261 Any enforcement
against the blockchain entity would suffer from the handicaps
discussed in Part III.B. A judgment calling for dissolution of a DAO
would have no effect upon code unless the code permits it. But a
court could enforce a judgment against any individual partners
whose identities are known, either because they were chief

259 Accord, Dan Ryan, FinCEN: Know Your Customer Requirements, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Feb. 7, 2016), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/02/07/fincen-know-your-customer-requirements/. “Know Your
Customer” rules require financial institutions to obtain certain information about their
customers before doing business with them. Genci Bilali, Know Your Customer-or Not, 43 U.
TOL. L. REV. 319, 320 (2012).
260 Financial Measures to Curb Speculation in Cryptocurrency Trading, Financial Services
Commission release (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.fsc.go.kr/eng/new_press/releases.jsp?menu
=01&bbsid=BBS0048.
261 Brown v. 1995 Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle Challenge, 931 F. Supp. 592, 594 (N.D. Ill.,
1996). But see, RCI Contractors & Engineers, Inc. v. Joe Rainero Tile Co., 666 F. Supp. 2d
621, 624 (W.D. Va. 2009).
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organizers or because the true identity behind their pseudonym has
been discovered.
The reach of U.S. securities law to these groups provides a
slightly more developed case study of how regulation might impact
blockchain entities—and, indeed, how it is shaping the evolution of
those entities. Essentially, the question is one of how much power
tokenholders have, and what rights and responsibilities should flow
from that power. Both questions are very much open, as we will see.
As we will also see, the nature of the solution to the governance
problem has direct repercussions for securities law.
On July 25, 2017, the SEC released a “Report of Investigation”
(SEC Report) deeming 2016 DAO tokens to be securities—meaning
that their issuance was illegal because the 2016 DAO did not
register an initial public offering with the SEC or qualify for an
exemption from registration. 262 While the SEC did not pursue an
enforcement action against the 2016 DAO organizers, the SEC
Report did have a profound effect on subsequent initial coin
offerings, which now seek to evade the reach of U.S. securities
laws. 263
The SEC’s conclusion that the 2016 DAO tokens were securities
is not surprising giving the breadth of the definition of one type of
security, the investment contract. 264 The Howey test for what
constitutes an investment contract is an investment of money in “a
common enterprise” where profits are expected to be derived “solely
from the efforts of others.” 265 A key focus of the SEC Report was the
fact that the DAO’s profits were to be derived from the efforts of
In
others, namely the DAO’s founders and its curators. 266
262 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
The DAO, U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (July 25, 2017), https://www.
sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf.
263 Id.
264 The Securities Act’s definition of “security” includes traditional financial instruments
such as stocks, bonds, and debentures, but also includes what has proved a capacious catchall term, “investment contract.” Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (July
25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf.
265 S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); S.E.C. v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004).
266 In the SEC’s analysis, “The DAO’s investors relied on the managerial and
entrepreneurial efforts of Slock.it and its co-founders, and The DAO’s Curators, to manage
The DAO and put forth project proposals that could generate profits for The DAO’s investors.”
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particular, the SEC cited the fact that Slock.it created the DAO
website, published a White Paper describing the DAO, and created,
maintained, and “closely monitored” online fora about the DAO. 267
They held themselves out as experts on Ethereum, and told
investors that they had selected curators “based on their expertise
and credentials.” 268 Slock.it also informed investors that it would
make the first proposal to the DAO. In short, “[t]hrough their
conduct and marketing materials, Slock.it and its co-founders led
investors to believe that they could be relied on to provide the
significant managerial efforts required to make The DAO a
success.” 269
The SEC emphasized in particular how dependent tokenholders
were on the efforts of Slock.it and its co-founders. “At the time of
the offering, The DAO’s protocols had already been pre-determined
by Slock.it and its co-founders, including the control that could be
exercised by the Curators.” 270
This characterization of the 2016 DAO tokens as securities
remains in dispute, however. Randolph Robinson takes issue with
the SEC’s Report, challenging the claim that the 2016 DAO was a
“common enterprise” under the Howey test. 271 Most intriguingly, he
argues that commonality requires “investors’ dependence on the
promoter’s expertise.” 272 But he argues, once the 2016 DAO’s code
Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The
DAO, U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION July 25, 2017), https://www.
sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf, at 12.
267 Id. at 10.
268 Id. at 12.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 13. That control was indeed substantial: Curators had the power to “(1) vet
Contractors; (2) determine whether and when to submit proposals for votes; (3) determine the
order and frequency of proposals that were submitted for a vote; and (4) determine whether
to halve the default quorum necessary for a successful vote on certain proposals.” Id. The
tokenholders could exercise relatively little power over the process, and still less over the
Curators themselves. Tokenholders could only vote on proposals whitelisted by the curators.
Id. at 8. While they could submit a proposal for a vote, the curators would need to greenlight
it before it was eligible for a tokenholder vote. Id. at 13. A tokenholder could proposal
replacing a curator, but current curators would have to whitelist the proposal in order for it
to come before the full body for a vote. “In essence, curators had the power to determine
whether a proposal to remove a curator was put to a vote.” Id.
271 Randolph Robinson, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of Initial Coin
Offerings, 8 (Sept. 1, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3087541.
272 Id. at 34.
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was launched, Slock.it, the 2016 DAO promoter, exercised no
expertise—indeed, it retained no control whatsoever over the
management of the DAO at all:
Unlike in a traditional enterprise where the promoter
or management enjoys special decision making
privileges or the ability to control entity assets, here, as
the promoter, Slock.it was just one of many token
holders, holding the same rights as any other token
holder in the DAO enterprise. Neither Slock.it nor any
other individual or entity could take any action to spend
DAO resources, incur obligations, or take any other
action independent of a vote of DAO Token holders. 273
Robinson argues that because, after launch, all decisions were made
collectively by all token holders, there was no collective reliance on
the DAO promoters’ expertise. 274 Similarly, Rohr and Wright argue
that “[b]ecause each token holder was entitled to participate in each
funding decision, it is at least arguable that token holders
participated sufficiently in the profit-making activities of the
enterprise” for them not to qualify as securities under Howey. 275
This feature means that DAO investors did not have an expectation
of profits solely from the efforts of others. Robinson also takes issue
with the SEC’s characterization of the Curators’ power, arguing
that it was much less significant than the SEC portrayed. 276
Hearkening back to the various governance possibilities Part VI
described, we begin to see how complicated, important, and
unsettled the question of intervention on the blockchain is. Even if
the 2016 DAO tokens were securities, if a future DAO tokenholder
earns reputation and uses that to weigh her votes heavily, at what
Id. at 40.
Id.
275 Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings,
and the Democratization of Public Capital Markets, 37 (October 4, 2017), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3048104.
276 Id. at 41-43. As we saw in Part II.B., the role of the Curators in the DAO was
controversial and disputed. Rohr and Wright observe that just because tokenholders could
only vote for whitelisted proposals does not necessarily mean that they were “sufficiently
dependent” on Curators’ efforts to deem the 2016 DAO tokens securities. See supra note 275
at 38.
273
274
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point is she no longer dependent “solely on the efforts of others” for
her profits?
The SEC Report could be describing common critiques of whether
the shareholder vote provides an effective constraint on a public
corporation’s managers when it observed:
the voting rights afforded DAO Token holders did not
provide them with meaningful control over the
enterprise, because (1) DAO Token holders’ ability to
vote for contracts was a largely perfunctory one; and (2)
DAO Token holders were widely dispersed and limited
in their ability to communicate with one another. 277
The SEC Report emphasizes the passive, public-companyshareholder-like role that the tokenholders played. 278 But the
blockchain vote, as we have seen, need not be largely perfunctory,
and DAOs of the future could make voting far from “perfunctory”
by, for example, creating reputation-weighted voting in the manner
of DAOStack. The blockchain could counteract wide dispersion of
holdings by coding limits on the number of tokens and could and
augment tokenholders’ ability to communicate with one another.
Thus far, ICOs have not followed this robust governance path—
nor have they used anonymity or pseudonymity to evade regulation.
Currently most ICOs are launched by an organization or group of
developers. 279 Some are traditional business entities or non-profits.
Others, like the 2016 DAO, are not formally organized at all. 280
They have taken various paths with regard to securities laws. Some
have openly flouted the SEC—and the SEC has taken an
277 See supra note 275 at 14. Rohr and Wright take issue with the SEC’s analysis here,
observing that it “may not be factually or legally accurate.” Id. at 38. Ten accounts owned
over 20% of the tokens, and overall the 2016 DAO “was controlled by only a handful of token
holders.” Id.
278 See generally, Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (July 25, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf.
279 See supra note 275 at 18.
280 A particular canton in Switzerland has been home to a disproportionate number of ICOs.
Financial Times: “The small canton of Zug, near Zurich, has unofficially become “Crypto
Valley.” Ralph Atkins, Switzerland embraces cryptocurrency culture, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan.
25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/c2098ef6-ff84-11e7-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5.
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increasingly active role in actions against them. 281 Others have
tried to evade the reach of U.S. securities laws in three ways.
First, some ICOs have tried to bar would-be investors from the
United States from participating, in the hopes that they will qualify
as foreign offerings under Regulation S. 282 In particular, many
recent ICOs have been launched by nonprofits organized in
Switzerland to evade the reach of U.S. securities law and the law of
other jurisdictions. 283 Second, promoters have directed offerings not
to the general public, but instead only to accredited investors, the
wealthy individuals who qualify to invest in private securities. 284
The SAFT (Simple Agreement for Future Tokens) suggests one way
to avoid liability under the securities laws is to offer
investment exclusively to accredited investors, who are more

281 See, e.g., SEC v. PlexCorps, 2017 WL 6398722 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (granting a preliminary
order and asset freeze against Dominic LaCroix and his owned entities for likely violation of
securities laws); SECURITY AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PRESS RELEASE: SEC EXPOSES TWO
INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS PURPORTEDLY BACKED BY REAL ESTATE AND DIAMONDS, RELEASE
NO. 2017-185 (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-185-0 (last
visited Feb. 25, 2018) (“The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a
businessman and two companies with defrauding investors in a pair of so-called initial coin
offerings (ICOs) purportedly backed by investments in real estate and diamonds.”).
282 Although EOS maintains that its tokens are not securities, it banned U.S. investors
because of state regulations blue sky laws. Frequently Asked Questions, EOS.IO, https://eos.
io/faq.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2018) (question 17). The Monaco Visa ICO employed a clickwrap block so US investors would not join. Dana-Edwards, ICOs are not for US Citizens? Should
ICOs reject self proclaimed US Citizens as a way to reduce legal and regulatory risk?, STEEMIT,
https://steemit.com/icos/@dana-edwards/icos-are-not-for-us-citizens-should-icos-rejec
t-selfproclaimed-us-citizens-as-a-way-to-reduce-legal-and-regulatory-risk, (last visited Jan. 28,
2018). The Cobinhood ICO also banned U.S. investors (and, unrelatedly, employed celebrity
Jamie Foxx to advertise via his twitter feed). See Are citizens of certain countries excluded from
participating in the COBINHOOD ICO?, COBINHOOD, https://cobinhood.zen desk.com/hc/enus/articles/115002484432-Are-citizens-of-certain-countries-excluded-from-part icipating-in-theCOBINHOOD-ICO- (last visited Feb. 20, 2018) (“While most participants of any citizenship can
join the ICO, unfortunately, we are unable to accept participation from citizens of The United
States of America, Canada, China, and Taiwan due to existing regulations in their respective
states.”); see also Eugene Kim, Cryptocurrency investors worry about a bubble as Jamie Foxx
and
other
celebrities
jump
on
board,
CNBC
(Sept.
19,
2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/19/jamie-foxx-ico-investors-worried.html.
283 Ralph Atkins, Switzerland embraces cryptocurrency culture, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 25,
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/c2098ef6-ff84-11e7-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5 (“Of the 10 biggest
proposed initial coin offerings—by which start-ups raise funds by selling tokens—four have used
Switzerland as a base.”).
284 Robinson Randolph, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of Initial Coin
Offerings, 24 (Sept. 1, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract _id=3087541.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3127782

2018]

LAW AND THE BLOCKCHAIN

61

sophisticated and better prepared to accept the risk. 285 In other
words, the SAFT promoters acknowledge that SAFTs are
investment contracts subject to the 1933 Act, but argue that they
qualify for exemption from registration because they are offered
only to accredited investors. 286 SAFT investors fund developers who
“develop a genuinely functional network, with genuinely functional
utility tokens, and then deliver those tokens to the investors. The
investors may then resell the tokens to the public, presumably for a
profit, and so may the developers.” 287 The tokens themselves are
merely “consumptive products,” 288 leading to the third manner of
evading the reach of U.S. securities law.
Finally, there has been an effort to develop public token offerings
would not be securities offerings under the Howey test. These token
offerings are “utility tokens” or “app coins,” that is, tokens to be used
for consumptive purposes, and whose primary purpose is not to be
held for future profit. 289 Utility tokens are more like a right to buy

285 Juan Batiz-Benet, Marco Santori, & Jesse Clayburgh, The SAFT Project: Toward a
Compliant Token Sale Framework, 19 (Oct. 2, 2017), https://saftproject.com/static/SAFTProject-Whitepaper.pdf. The SAFT is modeled on the SAFE, the Simple Agreement for
Future Equity. The SAFE is a contract in a fledgling corporation that provides that an
investor’s interest will convert automatically into equity if the company raises finances in the
future, is sold, or goes public. Joseph M. Green & John F. Coyle, Crowdfunding and the NotSo-Safe Safe, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 168, 172 (2016). SAFEs were created to offer a simple
solution to the problem often confronting early-stage entrepreneurs who needed to raise funds
quickly and cheaply, without the time and cost intensive negotiations that surround venture
financing and, increasingly, angel investing. Id.
286 Juan Batiz-Benet, Marco Santori, & Jesse Clayburgh, The SAFT Project: Toward a
Compliant Token Sale Framework, 4 (Oct. 2, 2017), https://saftproject.com/static/SAFTProject-Whitepaper.pdf.
287 Id. at 1.
288 Id. at 2. Several platforms have used the SAFT framework, including Unikrn, a sports
betting platform backed by Mark Cuban, and Kik, which raised $100 million in Ethereum to
develop a new social internet platform. See Form D, UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1718925/0001718925170
00003/xslFormDX01/primary_doc.xml (last visited Feb. 4, 2018); Eugene Kim, Crypto startups are trying to get their house in order ahead of a possible SEC crackdown, CNBC (Oct. 12,
2017, 12:16 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/12/crypto-start-ups-turn-to-safts-for-ico sraising-more-than-350m.html.
289 Gertrude
Chavez-Dreyfuss, Angela Moon, & Heekyong Yang, GLOBAL
CRYPTOCURRENCY CRACKDOWN SPARKS SEARCH FOR SAFE HAVENS, 9 WESTLAW J.
COMPUTER AND INTERNET 35 NO. 14 (2017 WL 6452835 at *2) (“Many U.S. startups thought
they could avoid such scrutiny by selling ‘utility tokens,’ which gave buyers access to products
or services rather than a stake in the company.”); See also supra note 275 at 32-33 (“Utility
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a future product or service than a right to participate in the profits
of a future enterprise. Rohr and Wright contrast these tokens with
what they term investment tokens, which “bestow express economic
rights on their holders.” 290 Nevertheless, many of these utility
token offerings have had a speculative component—either because
investors are betting that their use rights will go up in value, or
because they do not understand that they are not receiving an
equity interest in the offering.
The SEC is closely monitoring these developments and has
expressed skepticism about the proliferation of ICOs. Jay Clayton,
Chairman of the SEC, stated in December of 2017: “Merely calling
a token a ‘utility’ token or structuring it to provide some utility does
not prevent the token from being a security.” 291 Clayton further
noted that offerings that “emphasize the potential for profits based
on the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others” are “the
hallmarks of securities under U.S. law.” 292
One neat solution to the securities problem ICOs confront
involves not trying to evade the Howey test by not offering an
ownership interest; instead, it involves embracing the need for
governance and gap-filling by creating intervention points for
tokenholders to fill. Once set in motion, a smart contract continues
to operate autonomously—no single individual can stop it once it
has begun running. Thus, if the contract codes for meaningful
governance amongst DAO tokenholders, then the ownership
interest would not generate profits “solely through efforts of others.”
Instead, it would look more like a true partnership interest. This
solution has the benefit of neatly tying two threads this Article has
explored: it not only solves the Howey securities problem, but also
reintroduces a place for gap-filling in what will inevitably an
incomplete contract for firm organization at the outset of an
undertaking. The result would be that the DAO will function more
like the partnership it technically is under the law.
tokens confer on their owners some right that is typically consumptive in nature—the ability to
participate on a messaging platform, for example, or to surf the Internet free of ads.”).
290 See supra note 275, at 32.
291 Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-st
atement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11.
292 Id.
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The point of this Article, however, is not to suggest a solution to
the Howey problem current ICOs confront. Instead, its argument is
simply that the blockchain reshuffles the relationship between the
law and private ordering. For better and for worse, the blockchain
does not provide parties with the intervention points corporeal firms
naturally supply. That lack of intervention point is both a bug and
a feature. Incomplete contracting teaches that intervention points
are necessary. The DAOs of the future, if they exist, will be able to
configure governance rules in ways previously unimaginable. But
legal intervention points remain wherever blockchain organizers
and their identifiable organizers meet.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article makes no claims that the blockchain is an
unregulable space. The history of Internet regulation has taught us
that borders, governments, and authority will inexorably extend
wherever legal intervention points exist. 293 Instead, its focus has
been on the world of private ordering and the usual relationship
between contracting parties and private law that arises on the
blockchain. If parties generally “bargain in the shadow of the
law,” 294 so too have they traditionally contracted in the shadow of
default rules. Not on the blockchain.
The nexus of smart contracts of the blockchain represents a
fundamental challenge to business association law and contracts
law more generally. Traditionally, the law must and does provide
its own governing rules all the time. One such rule, for example,
establishes fiduciary duties. Agency law, the most fundamental
building block of business association law, provides for a fiduciary
duty owed by agent to principal, whether or not their agreement
makes mention of it. 295 Business associations law fills gaps.
There are no similar background rules in the DAO. The DAO
explicitly codes the contract law to which it is subject, and default
293 See generally, Jack Goldsmith & Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a
Borderless World (2006).
294 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979).
295 Accord 3 CJS Agency § 271; Restatement (Second) of Agency § 387 (1957).
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rules have no legal intervention point in which to take effect. Put
differently, there is no room in the DAO for a court to determine
whether fiduciary duties are owed or what business form an entity
takes. There is no room for courts to effectuate these kinds of
judgments. Absent explicit coding, there is no room for the default
function of contract law.
Moreover, prior business association law offered a type of penalty
default: entrepreneurs filed with the state to obtain specific entity
status, or were swept into the default business form, the
partnership. 296 The attraction of the corporate form was that it
provided a reliable way to erect barriers between creditors and
assets in a way that contract alone could not. Without the shield of
the corporate entity, unsuspected claims from creditors outside the
firm threatened. Because of the public nature of the blockchain’s
ledger, however, each of the firm’s contracting parties can see the
full extent of the firm’s obligations and, by contract alone, protect
against them. A partner in a traditional partnership might fear
that the partnership was taking on too many obligations, and that
her assets might be on the hook. A tokenholder need not fear such
claims unless the code affirmatively gave creditors access to her
assets—at least, until her pseudonym was discovered. Conversely,
and perhaps more importantly, firm creditors and tokenholders
alike could trust that a DAO cannot be liquidated by a tokenholder
or a tokenholder’s creditors—simply because the code does not
provide such power.
But the danger of incomplete contracting remains. Blockchain
business organizations cannot evolve to the point that they no
longer need contract law—or, more precisely, that they no longer
need the gap-filling that contract law traditionally provides. The
2016 DAO’s story, although in one sense the height of innovation,
also revealed its fatal flaw. The nexus of contracts literature views
the law—including, but not limited to business organization law—
as a gap filler. 297 The 2016 DAO, like the Titanic’s claim to be the
296 Joshua A. T. Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1444 (2009) (“Corporations, limited liability partnerships, and
other legally defined business associations present a standardized face to the public,
declaring the extent of limited liability protection.”).
297 William W. Bratton, Jr., Nexus of Contracts Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 407, 407 (1989).
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unsinkable ship, failed in the hubris of the idea that its coders could
lay down rules at inception and then have a business organization
run on autopilot.
This Article has used the law of business associations as a lens
through which to view the relationship of law to the blockchain, but
its lessons extend beyond the reach of organizational law. The
blockchain offers the heady promise of self-enforcing contracts,
making it possible to transact with strangers is a “trustless”
environment. Yet with this promise comes a concomitant need to
reexamine just what role law plays in the relationship between
contracting parties—and how that role changes when the
customary intervention points no longer exist. The story of
securities law’s shaping of ICOs to offer utility tokens reminds that
legal intervention points remain, not in the blockchain itself, but in
its interface with the corporeal world. Like the Internet before it,
the blockchain is subject to regulation from governments around the
world. 298 This Article provides a first attempt to think through how
the law can, and cannot, work upon the blockchain.

See generally Jack Goldsmith & Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a
Borderless World (2006).
298
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